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ABSTRACT

The current method for calculating excess hospital readmission penalties does not
incorporate measures of socioeconomic status, thereby leaving nonprofit teaching and
safety net hospitals vulnerable to financial reimbursement penalties due to exogenously
determined heterogeneous patient populations. The literature has shown that
socioeconomically disadvantaged groups are readmitted to nonprofit teaching hospital's
in higher proportions than more advantaged groups. Increased readmission to nonprofit
teaching hospitals has been linked with cost shifting from those unable to pay to those
with the ability to pay for medical care. Therefore, a new method for determining hospital
excess readmission penalties is needed to reduce the incentive of cost shifting and
penalize underperforming hospitals in a more justifiable way.
The two objectives of this research are to demonstrate the differences among
hospital readmission rates by hospital type, and to demonstrate how the current Hospital
Readmission Reduction program penalizes nonprofit teaching hospitals for excess
readmissions as a result of their exogenous patient mix. A proposed method of adjusting
excess readmission penalty determination uses patient insurance status to proxy for
socioeconomic status. Hospitals are then grouped into quintiles of similar distributions
based on patient mix. The proposed method of calculating excess readmission penalties
is applied to a database of hospital claims for acute myocardial infarction (AMI) patients
in the state of South Carolina. Results of the proposed method are then compared to
results from the existing Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) method of
calculating excess readmission penalties. The collected empirical data is subsequently
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used to construct bootstrapped samples to re-estimate excess readmission penalty. The
bootstrapped analysis showed the difference in same hospital readmission penalties
between the two methods resulted in a 1.12% revenue reduction for nonprofit teaching
hospitals and 0.22% reduction for non-teaching hospitals. As a result, controlling for
hospital patient characteristics caused by exogenous patient mix is likely to reduce the
degree of hospital cost shifting to private payers.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Healthcare policy reform is a complex and multifaceted problem that has plagued
the United States for decades. The most recent healthcare policy reform is The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), which was signed into law on
March 23, 2010. Originally passed to provide healthcare coverage to most Americans,
the law is comprised of several smaller pieces of legislation to reform healthcare policy
(Cannon, 2013). The intent of the law is to simultaneously improve health care quality
and lower the cost of doing so nationwide. One important facet of this legislation is The
Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP). Hospital Readmissions within 30
days of a previous hospital admission have been shown to be a costly and undesired
healthcare outcome (Nagasako et al. 2014, Jenks et. al 2009). Higher patient cost result
from unplanned readmissions caused by misaligned incentives whereby a hospital
receives compensation through Medicare reimbursements for the quality of care initially
provided by a hospital. Prior to HRRP hospitals were effectively incentivized by the
volume of patients rather than the quality of care provided. HRRP aims to improve the
quality of care and lower costs by requiring hospitals to minimize the probability of
readmission.
Established by section 3025 of the PPACA to improve the quality of care to the
Medicare population, HRRP assesses penalties in the form of reduced reimbursement
payments to hospitals with ‘excessive’ readmissions. The HRRP was implemented on
October 1, 2012 by calculating excess readmissions ratios over a 3-year period for three
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diagnostic conditions, acute myocardial infarction (AMI), heart failure, and pneumonia.
The law was further expanded to include exacerbations of chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, total knee and total hip arthroplasty in 2015. To determine excess readmissions,
the program compares each individual hospital readmission rate to the national
readmission rate calculated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
Through a proprietary algorithm, CMS includes hospital and patient level variables to set
an acceptable baseline readmission rate for each condition to which all hospitals are
compared. Any hospital deemed to have a readmission rate in excess of the accepted
readmission rate is penalized based on the ratio of excess readmissions to the accepted
readmission rate. These excess readmission ratios provide the foundation for determining
penalties in the form of a payment adjustment factor applied to Medicare reimbursement.
In the first year of this program, nearly two thirds of US hospitals received
penalties for having readmissions rates above the CMS threshold rate. This resulted in
2,225 hospitals receiving total penalties of roughly $280 million in the form of reduced
Medicare reimbursements (Williams 2013). In percentage terms, the penalties were
capped at a maximum of a 2% reduction in a hospital's Medicare reimbursement in 2014
and a 3% reduction in 2015. Since 2012, there have been improvements in conditionadjusted readmissions rates and associated reimbursement penalties, with a decrease in
the average penalty of 0.42% to 0.38% reduction in Medicare reimbursement (Rau 2013,
MEDPAC 2013). Despite the marginal improvements as a result of HRRP, the legislation
has a significant drawback by treating all hospitals as one homogenous group.
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Many of the 2,225 hospitals are penalized for exogenous reasons outside their
control as reported in the readmissions literature (Joynt, Jha 2013, Philbin et al., 2001).
The primary driver of excess readmissions among larger teaching and safety net hospitals
is the greater percentage of poor patients readmitted than patients of higher
socioeconomic class (Kamerow, 2013, Lewin et al. 2000). Socioeconomic status is
currently not taken into account when calculating excess readmissions rates, and many
argue it should be included (Mueller et al. 2013, and Shahian et al. 2012, Philbin et al
2001, Shimizu et al. 2014). As these authors note, lower socioeconomic status increases
the likelihood of readmission due to patients having less access to care, non-compliance
to physician orders, and lower nutritional status, among many other reasons.
Teaching hospital's provide post graduate medical education to physicians, nurses
and other medical professionals. Teaching hospitals are typically affiliated with a
medical school or a university, and are closely tied to state and federal government
through subsidies for medical student and medical resident education. In contrast, safety
net hospitals provide care to large proportions of low-income, uninsured, or vulnerable
patients. Many of these patients are unwilling or unable to pay for hospital services.
Hospitals providing uncompensated care receive federal funding to cover these costs in
much greater proportion to total revenue than non-safety net hospitals. Moreover, some
teaching hospitals may also serve as safety net hospitals.
The key is to understand the relation between hospital type, patient
socioeconomic status and hospital readmission rate. Outside of true emergency cases,
some hospitals can refuse care to patients due to inability to pay. Safety net hospitals
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cannot refuse patients, and thereby often receive poor patients in higher proportions
(Lewin et al. 2000). Another common characteristic is safety net hospitals are nonprofit
institutions, and many teaching hospitals are also nonprofit. As to be discussed, nonprofit
and for-profit hospitals have different objectives in terms of profit motive and importance
of "prestige."
The Yale New Haven Health Services Corporation (YNHHSC), which provides
analytical support to CMS and helped develop the current standards for the HRRP,
explains the current rational for not including socioeconomic status when calculating
excess readmissions:
"The measures also do not adjust for socioeconomic status because the
association between socioeconomic status and health outcomes can be
due, in part, to differences in the quality of healthcare groups of patients
with varying socioeconomic status receive. Risk adjusting for
socioeconomic status could also mask important disparities and
minimize incentives to improve outcomes for vulnerable populations
(page 12)."
Nagasako et al. outline the argument well stating that the current policy, which
excludes socioeconomic status, is maintianed ..."in order to maintain the visibility of
differences in health outcomes for groups with different socioeconomic status
characteristics (2014, page 787)." However, Nagasako et al. also note that there is a
strong need to control for socioeconomic status factors "...to avoid disproportionately
penalizing hospitals that care for a large number of patients from disadvantaged
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backgrounds and communities (2014, page 787)." Furthermore, Shimizu et al. find that
the current standard of assessing hospital readmissions as an indicator of medical care
quality is inadequate because it is applied irrespective of the patient populations served at
hospitals throughout the country (Shimizu et al., 2014).
Joynt and Jha were among the first to expand the literature by reporting
differences in Medicare reimbursement penalties stratified by hospital characteristics.
They found that larger hospitals (>400 beds) received greater penalties than their smaller
counterparts (<200 beds). Joynt and Jha showed that 40% of large hospitals were highly
penalized compared to 28% of small hospitals. Highly penalized is considered a
Medicare reimbursement reduction penalty above 0.72%, and a low penalty is less than a
0.15% reimbursement reduction. Additionally, major teaching hospitals are more likely
to be highly penalized (44%) than non-teaching hospitals (33%) based on adjusted odds
ratios from a multinomial logistic regression (P<0.001) (Joynt, Jha 2013). The evidence
suggests that these differences are due in large part to socioeconomic factors as well as
the greater proportion of medically complex cases larger teaching hospitals encounter, as
compared to smaller non-teaching hospitals. Joynt and Jha clearly show that the level of
Medicare reimbursement penalties are correlated with socioeconomic status. The authors
provide adjusted odds ratios demonstrating that major teaching hospitals, which serve a
more socioeconomically disadvantaged population, are more likely to be highly penalized
(above average penalties) than non-teaching hospitals (44% versus 33%) and less likely
to not be penalized than non-teaching hospitals (19% versus 35%, respectively).
Additionally, Joynt and Jha found that safety-net hospitals are also more likely to be
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highly penalized than non-safety-net hospitals (44% versus 30%) This result supports
the hypothesis that lower socioeconomic status is often associated with increased medical
complexity, and highly complex medical cases are admitted to teaching and safety net
hospitals in a higher proportion relative to other hospital types (Philbin et al., 2001).
Thus, teaching and safety net hospitals are likely to have a higher readmission rate.
Differences in patient populations among teaching versus non-teaching hospitals
has been understood for decades but are now especially problematic and relevant due to
the penalties associated with HRRP and PPACA. In 2001, Philbin et al. analyzed
socioeconomic status as a risk factor for hospital readmission, following previous
admission for heart failure. They found that after adjusting for other confounding factors,
lower income is a positive predictor of readmission risk based on a statistically
significant difference in the proportion of readmissions between the highest and lowest
income quartiles using a Mantel-Haenszel chi-squared test (P<0.0001) (Philbin et al.,
2001). More recently, studies assessing hospital care quality have shown that major
teaching hospitals have lower mortality rates but higher readmission rates (Shahian 2012,
Meuller 2013).
The emphasis on the quality of care provided by hospitals is a direct result of the
PPACA, and is beginning to positively impact the U.S. health care industry by insuring
more people. However, adjustments may be needed to ensure the longevity and
continued improvement of the PPACA. Based on the cited literature, some of these
program adjustments focus on the use of the HRRP to determine hospital quality in the
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changing healthcare industry. One of the primary policy changes being considered is
incorporation of socioeconomic status into the excess readmission calculation.
In a report to Congress in June of 2013, the Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission (MEDPAC) proposed several changes to the structure of HRRP (2013). One
proposed change is to group hospitals based on the proportion of poor patients they serve
and then calculate benchmark readmission rates of the "within" group average to which
they will be compared. This proposed change is not a direct risk adjustment for
socioeconomic status yet it functions in a similar way.
Many of the changes proposed by MEDPAC focus on the imbalance of incidence
and magnitude of penalties for major teaching hospitals. MEDPAC documents that major
teaching hospitals have received the highest average penalty, a 0.45% reduction in 2014
Medicare reimbursements, and also have the highest share of hospitals receiving the
maximum 2% penalty relative to other hospital classifications. These differences might
be explained by the federal obligation that teaching hospitals treat and care for the more
disadvantaged patient groups. Until recently, such teaching hospitals received
reimbursements through disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments to compensate
for the uninsured care they provide. The commission noted that major teaching hospitals
receiving the highest penalties are also the hospitals receiving higher DSH payments.
DSH payments are designed to compensate hospitals for the care and treatment of
uninsured patients. However, at the time of MEDPAC's report, there was a legal and
political debate nationwide which would confound the availability of future DHS
payments to large teaching hospitals.
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When the PPACA was signed into law on March 23, 2010, the constitutionality of
various aspects of the PPACA was challenged by the Supreme Court of the United States
in National Federation of Independent Business versus Sebelius, 2012. In their ruling on
June 28, 2012, the Court declared that most of the components of the PPACA were
constitutional except for the federal requirement that all states expand Medicaid
eligibility to 138% of the federal poverty level. The court ruled that legislative change is
a decision left up to the states. (The same legal situation as prior to the PPACA, where
the eligibility requirement was left to each state, thereby resulting in highly variable
Medicaid eligibility requirements nationwide.) The objective of nationally standardized
Medicaid eligibility among all states is just one component of the PPACA meant to work
in conjunction with the federal reduction in DSH payments. Under the original concept,
no problem was anticipated because all states would have expanded Medicaid eligibility
under the same rule, thereby providing access to health insurance for the poorest segment
of the population. However, the Supreme Court ruling created the possibility of a large
gap in health insurance coverage for the most economically disadvantaged people in
states voting to not expand Medicaid eligibility. Theoretically, if states expanded
Medicaid eligibility in conjunction with all other requirements of the PPACA, there
would be few gaps in insurance coverage thereby rendering DSH payments almost
unnecessary. However, in states that forgo the "option" to expand Medicaid eligibility, a
gap of uninsured socioeconomically disadvantaged people will remain. Further
compounding the coverage issue is the fact that when this population receives care from
hospitals legally required to treat them, the hospital will no longer be reimbursed for their
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care. Consequently, when this same population is readmitted, the hospital will have to
pay for their treatment and might be subject to losing a portion of their Medicare
reimbursement for the excessive readmission.
In 2013, Nikki Haley, the governor of South Carolina (SC), vowed not to expand
Medicaid Eligibility to South Carolinians. Her decision has resulted in an insurance
coverage gap for some of the poorest people in SC, which has placed the burden of
uncompensated care directly on larger teaching hospitals, which serve as safety net
hospitals. The uninsured South Carolina population, which as Philbin et al. (2001)
demonstrated, is more likely to be readmitted to the hospital, places the financial burden
directly on teaching hospitals in two ways. First, the hospital must provide care to
patients for which they are not completely reimbursed due to reduced DSH payments.
Second, these patients contribute to a health center's marginal "excess" readmission rate,
resulting in a Medicare reimbursement penalty and additional cost. The full ramifications
of this outcome are not known. However, economic theory suggests hospitals might
attempt to recover the deficit by shifting the cost of care from the uninsured to private
payers. Another way to smooth the cost differential in SC teaching hospitals would be
for the federal government reimbursement guidelines to include socioeconomic status as
a factor in the risk-adjustment calculation.
Currently CMS does not include a measure of socioeconomic status in the
calculation of excess readmissions and associated penalties. However, a growing body of
literature clearly identifies socioeconomic status as a determining factor in hospital
readmission (Philbin et.al, 2001, Shahian 2012, Meuller 2013). This literature clearly
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documents that low income patients have increasingly gone to nonprofit teaching and
safety net hospitals for medical care (Lewin et al. 2000). These two issues in
combination with the HRRP treating all hospitals as a homogenous group has resulted in
an inappropriate standardized measure for calculating hospital Medicare reimbursement
penalties and the degree of penalties they receive.
While it is important to document the differences between for-profit hospitals and
nonprofit teaching hospitals, it is also important to consider the distribution and evolution
of the two hospital types within the medical care market. Inherent to this market is the
obligation to provide care to socioeconomically disadvantaged patients without an ability
to pay, a role often assumed by nonprofit teaching hospitals. The act of providing
uncompensated care can decrease revenues. It has been theorized that nonprofit hospitals
may offset their revenue losses through gains in prestige associated with the provision of
uncompensated care (Hirth 1997; Rosenman et al. 2000). An extension of Gary Becker's
"A Theory of Social Interaction" is presented in Chapter III to demonstrate how the role
of nonprofit hospitals is similar to the role of a "charitable" family member motivated by
social acclaim through charitable actions (Becker, 1974). The notion of prestige
optimization among nonprofit teaching hospitals is of primary importance in any
discussion of medical care markets.
The objectives of this research are twofold. First, to illustrate the differences
among hospital readmission rates by hospital type; second, to demonstrate how the
current Hospital Readmission Reduction program penalizes nonprofit teaching hospitals
for excess readmissions as a result of their patient mix. It is hypothesized that by
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developing a measure of excess hospital readmission that considers patient mix (patient
characteristics), hospitals that serve a greater proportion of poor patients, who are often
much sicker at admittance, will have a significant decrease in reimbursement penalty
relative to the penalties they are now subject to as estimated under existing protocol.
A longitudinal data set of SC hospital visits is used to analyze the current method
for calculating readmissions for Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI). The difference in
readmission rates between teaching and non-teaching hospitals is analyzed directly using
chi-squared tests, and logistic regression analysis. Additionally a Cox Proportional
Hazards model was used to test differences in hazard ratios between teaching and nonteaching hospitals. Readmission rates under the current and proposed MEDPAC methods
are analyzed to assess differences in excess readmission penalties between the two
methodologies. With the first method being the current HRRP method for assessing
hospital readmissions, and the second method proposed by MEDPAC, that assesses
excess readmissions by stratifying hospitals by the proportion of low income patients
they serve. The magnitude of the estimated readmission penalty is a primary component
of lost hospital revenue and can result in cost shifting. With reduced Medicare
reimbursement as a result of excessive readmissions penalties stemming from patient
mix, the revenue burden may be shifted to commercial insurance payers through higher
hospital charges, which ultimately results in higher insurance premiums. Estimated
readmissions penalties are compared under the current and proposed method to proxy for
the potential degree of cost shifting as a result of differences in patient mix. Results from
this comparison are used to determine which penalty structure is least influenced by
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socioeconomically disadvantaged patient populations. Previous research (White 2013,
Morrisey 1993, 1994, 1996, Frakt 2010) has found that while cost shifting might exist as
a result of reduced public payment, the degree of cost shifting is likely minor and
primarily a result of market structure and hospital competition. Prior research also
provides evidence against cost shifting and labels the increased cost phenomena as price
discrimination. Regardless of the name placed on hospital behavior in response to
reduced public payment, the fact remains that hospitals will attempt to recoup the reduced
revenue from discrepancies in readmissions penalties stemming from diverse patient
populations. These issues are discussed further in Chapter VI.
A review of the literature is presented in Chapter II. A theoretical model of cost
shifting as a foundation for understanding the impact of socioeconomic status on
readmissions penalties is presented in Chapter III. SC hospital data are presented in
Chapter IV along with empirical discussion of the models being tested. Results are
presented in Chapter V. Policy conclusions and research extensions are provided in
Chapter VI.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The problem of hospital readmission has plagued hospitals long before the
inception of Medicare’s fee-for-service program. As discussed in Chapter I, care
providers were previously incentivized by the volume of patients cared for rather than the
quality of care provided to those patients. With the introduction of the Hospital
Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP), the focus shifted away from herding patients
in and out as quickly as possible towards a more quality centric focus. Historically,
hospitals have been paid by Medicare for each patient based on diagnoses and procedures
each time a patient is discharged from the hospital. Thus, if a patient returns to the
hospital it begins the process anew, representing misaligned incentive structures as
hospitals receive additional compensation for each readmittance. This protocol has
exacerbated quality and cost concerns. The removal of this misaligned incentive through
HRRP now requires hospitals to focus on the initial quality of care they provide to reduce
the likelihood of an unplanned readmission. HRRP is proving to be an effective program
with overall readmission rates falling to an average of 17.8% in 2012, from an average of
19.0% over the previous five years (Ness, 2013). However, there are many questions
associated with the efficacy of the current readmission penalty structure. One main
concern is the difference in case mix between non-teaching hospitals and larger teaching
hospitals, which tend to serve the poorer and underinsured portion of the health care
population (Kamerow, 2013).
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Differences in hospitals often go further than just teaching or safety net status. In
South Carolina for example, only a few hospitals treat severe heart attacks. Smaller
hospitals transfer heart patients to larger hospitals, which can better serve them through
more technologically advanced, resource-intensive care. Transferring patients places
more pressure on teaching hospitals (which serve as treatment centers for severe cases)
because if patients are readmitted for any reason it is the terminal hospital visit, which is
charged with the readmission, not the initial hospital that transferred the patient. To gain
an understanding of how diagnoses, timing, and other factors contribute to hospital
readmissions, and how these factors vary among hospitals, it is necessary to review the
literature.
Previous studies (Jenks 2009, Naylor 2004, Dharmarajan 2013) estimated the
relationship between patient characteristics, including severity of illness at admission,
and the time to readmission using Kaplan Meier curves, and Cox Proportional Hazard
models. Jenks, Williams, and Coleman, analyzed the Medicare Provider Analysis and
Review (MEDPAR) data file for all US Medicare fee-for-service patients from October
1, 2003 through September 30, 2004. The study population consisted of 11,855,702
patients deemed at risk for readmission, after removing records for patient death and
transfers (2009). The cohort was analyzed for readmission at censored intervals of 30,
60, 90, 180, and 365 days for the five most common medical conditions and surgical
procedures. The authors calculated the 30-day readmission rate, total readmission rate
over the study period, as well as the readmission rate for the 10 most frequent readmitting
conditions. The 30-day readmission rates for heart failure and pneumonia were 26.9%
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and 20.1% respectively. The authors also calculated the national all condition 30-day
readmission rate for the 2003 fiscal year to be 18.1%. Jenks, Williams, and Coleman
identified the specific predictors of 30-day readmission. These predictors are (1) multiple
prior hospitalizations over the study period; (2) an index length of stay (LOS) at least
twice as long as average for an admission in the same diagnosis related group (DRG); (3)
the disabled; (4) those receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) (indicative of
poverty status); and (5) individuals older than 70 years of age.
While Jenks, Williams and Coleman focused on patient characteristics that
contribute to readmission, much of the literature has focused on care transitions. The
transition of care from a hospital setting to home requires education of the patient as well
as the care takers on medication reconciliation and coordination of follow-up care.
Research on hospital readmission (MEDPAC, 2007) illustrates that early hospital
readmissions, within 7 days, are related to the quality of care received in the hospital.
Conversely, the bulk of readmissions occurring after 7 days are related to issues
surrounding discharge education and patient follow up (Stone, 2010). Readmission
reduction programs focusing on care transition have been very successful and are now
implemented in almost all hospitals nationwide as a result of HRRP (Ashton et al.,
Coleman et al., Hansen et al.).
One of the more prominent, successful interventions to improve care transition
was studied in a randomized controlled trial done by Naylor et al. (2004). In this trial, the
authors examined the effectiveness of using an advanced practice nurse (APN) trained
specifically in heart failure to monitor patients with a heart failure admission, with the
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aim of reducing unnecessary readmissions. The authors recruited 239 patients admitted
for heart failure and randomized them into either the intervention group, which received
the care of an APN, or to a control group, which received routine care of the admitting
hospital. The intervention group received three months of post hospitalization APN
coordination between primary physician, pharmacists, and patients. The intervention
group also had daily access to the APN as needed, including 24 hour follow up at the
patient's home after leaving the hospital. The APN also fostered collaboration among the
patient's therapists to inform the primary physician of progress and discuss needed
changes in the care regimen. The effectiveness of APN coordination was analyzed by
studying the differences in readmission rates between the control and intervention groups.
The authors used Kaplan-Meier curves and Cox Proportional Hazard models to assess
differences in timing and diagnosis of readmissions.
Study results found that fewer intervention group patients were readmitted within
one year, as compared to the control group (44.9%, 55.4% respectively). Furthermore, the
authors found improvements in reported quality of life as well as higher patient
satisfaction ratings with the care provided by the intervention groups as compared to the
control groups (Naylor et al., 2004). These improvements in readmission rates, quality of
life, and patient satisfaction also resulted in an overall mean cost savings of intervention
group of $4,845 per patient including the cost of training and compensating the APN's, as
compared to traditional care in the control group. Here, costs represent the total cost to
treat a patient through the entire course of their illness. The care coordination
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intervention was shown to be effective, both financially and clinically, in a controlled
setting.
A more recent analysis of the diagnosis and timing of 30-day hospital
readmissions was done by Dharmarajan et al (2013). They used Medicare fee-for-service
claims from 2007-2009 to analyze diagnoses and timing for heart attacks (acute
myocardial infarction, or AMI), heart failure, and pneumonia readmissions. These
readmissions were categorized in ranges to analyze differences in diagnoses and
readmission rates for date ranges including 0-3, 0-7, 0-15, 0-30, 4-7, 8-15, and 16-30
days. The authors used Kaplan-Meier survival curves censored at 30-days to analyze
differences in time to readmission for 10 diagnosis categories. Cox proportional hazard
models were estimated to determine the relation between patient characteristics and time
to readmission by diagnosis group. However, the authors were unable to show any
difference in readmission rates attributable to patient demographics, or time to
readmission for hospitalizations of heart failure, heart attack, or presence of pneumonia.
If patients are readmitted at similar rates across age, sex, and race, what factors
lead to differences in readmissions rates among hospitals? Joynt and Jha (2013) answer
this question by analyzing differences in readmission rates and penalties by hospital type.
Using HRRP data, they found that major teaching hospitals are more likely to be both
penalized and more highly penalized when compared to non-teaching hospitals. Joynt and
Jha mention that these "differences between hospitals are likely related to both case mix
(medical complexity) and socioeconomic mix of the patient populations (page 343,
2013)." Incorporated into the readmissions estimates reported by Joynt and Jha are HRRP
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methods of risk adjusting to control for indicators of patient frailty (YNHHSC 2014).
Therefore, if medical comorbidities (multiple chronic diseases affecting patient's health,
ex. diabetes, hypertension, smoking) are controlled through risk adjustments, the
resulting differences in readmissions pointed out by Joynt and Jha are due to differences
in the socioeconomic populations at teaching versus non-teaching hospitals.
Mueller et al. (2013), and Shahian et al. (2012) test the hypothesis that teaching
and non-teaching hospitals differ in quality and performance. Both studies concluded that
teaching hospitals have lower mortality rates and higher readmissions rates than nonteaching hospitals. The higher readmission rate was surprising since teaching hospitals
have more advanced clinical techniques. They explain this outcome by noting the high
proportion of disadvantaged populations served by teaching hospitals are likely sicker
when initially admitted.
Few papers have directly addressed the possible links between socioeconomic
status and likelihood of readmission. Philbin et al. (2001) analyzed the socioeconomic
status as a risk factor for readmission in heart failure patients in New York state hospitals.
They found that patients from the lowest household income quartile had a significantly (p
<0.0001) higher percentage of readmission (23%) as compared to patients from the
highest income quartile (20%). Furthermore, the authors point out that 65% of
hospitalizations for lower income patients are in teaching hospitals, compared to 44%
among higher income groups. Supporting this conclusion, Lindenauer et al. (2013) found
a 1.5% increase in the risk of hospital readmission for every 5% increase in Gini
coefficient. Stated another way, if the difference in mean income between the highest
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and lowest income quartile across patients increases by 5%, hospital readmissions would
increase by 1.5%. Thus, as the disparity in patient incomes at a hospital grows, so does
the readmission rate.
Shimizu et al. analyzed the factors related to readmission at a single teaching
hospital (2014). The authors tracked all readmissions to their institution, Harbor-UCLA
Medical Center from January through September of 2012. Harbor-UCLA Medical
Center provides care to predominantly poor, uneducated, and very ill patients. They argue
that their patient population is primarily responsible for their above US hospital average
readmission rate. They conclude that that higher readmission rates at teaching hospitals
are not related to the quality of care provided, but rather the characteristics of the patient
population.
Thus, teaching hospitals are being penalized more for patient characteristics than
quality of health care provided. Additional studies by Shimizu et al., Lindenauer et al.,
and Philbin et al. also support the hypothesis that readmissions rates at teaching hospitals
are not a reflection of inadequate medical care, but rather the result of caring for a
socioeconomically disadvantaged set of patients who often lack health insurance and tend
to be sicker when admitted to the hospital. Aims to mitigate this specific issue are
currently being debated and analyzed. In June of 2013 the Medicare Payment Advisory
Committee (MEDPAC) issued a report to the US Congress with guidelines for refining
the HRRP. One proposed refinement to HRRP is to explicitly recognize hospital
readmission rates are positively correlated with their share of low-income patients
(MEDPAC 2013).
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The MEDPAC report notes the high readmission rate among teaching hospitals is
directly tied to admitting low income patients who are more likely to be sicker upon
admission. They further note that although The Centers for Medicaid and Medicare
Services (CMS) risk adjust based on medical conditions such as increased age and other
chronic conditions such as diabetes, they do not directly risk adjust based on
socioeconomic status. Lower socioeconomic status is associated with increased incidence
of these chronic conditions; however, it is not explicitly incorporated into CMS's
algorithm assessing excess readmissions.
To examine the impact of socioeconomic status on readmission rates, hospitals
were stratified into deciles by the proportion of Medicare patients who also qualified for
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) (MEDPAC). SSI is a federal program for seniors
and disabled individuals with incomes of less than $1,000 a month (MEDPAC). Analysis
of readmission rates and penalties under the current HRRP scheme resulted in a strong
monotonic relationship between the proportion of patients on SSI and readmission
penalties (MEDPAC). While it may be difficult to dramatically reduce readmissions rates
for hospitals treating the uninsured and poor, it may be possible to bring the rates closer
to a national average using more comprehensive readmission measures. Hospitals that
serve a large proportion of poor patients should see a downward shift in their excess
readmission rate as a result of incorporating a proxy for socioeconomic status into the
excess readmission calculation. The effect of this proposed policy change should more
fairly treat hospitals that cater to the more socioeconomically disadvantaged.
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This policy change provides a means to reduce penalties to teaching hospitals
required to care for poorer, sicker patients. Evaluating hospitals in relation to their peers
by share of care provided to low-income patients will provide an improved reference of
comparison over the current comparison to the national average. For example, each
hospital in a decile could be compared to the decile average, or group average,
readmission rate to determine excess readmissions. Hospitals will still report their
individual readmission rates, but when calculating penalties, hospitals will be compared
to the performance of hospitals with similar economic patient profiles. This approach
does not directly adjust for socioeconomic status. However, the group comparisons
smooth the differences in patient mix among hospitals by controlling for income level.
Furthermore, the reduction in excess readmissions penalties associated with this policy
change will decrease the need for hospitals to shift the cost burden to other revenue
sources.
In summary, this literature review addressed the issue of how socioeconomic
status relates to excess readmissions. Dharmarajan et al. (2013) reveal that readmission
rates are not influenced by demographic factors or timing; leaving differences in
readmission rates to be explained by other factors that historically have not been
considered, such as socioeconomic status. Furthermore, Joynt and Jha documented
differences in excess readmission penalties among hospital types. They note that larger
teaching hospitals are more likely to receive higher penalties than non-teaching hospitals
(2013). Several authors explain the difference in readmission rates as a function of
patient socioeconomic characteristics (Mueller et al. 2013, and Shahian et al. 2012,
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Philbin et al 2001, Shimizu et al. 2014). Utilizing this research, the MEDPAC report
presents a solution that indirectly adjusts for hospital patient mix to more fairly calculate
excess readmission penalties.
Building on this literature, an economic framework describing how hospitals are
being unequally penalized due to variations in patient mixes is presented in the following
chapter. The impact of socioeconomic status on readmission rates for AMI in South
Carolina is calculated by hospital type using a model of the type described by the
MEDPAC report. The estimated readmission rates are then used to determine the
reduction in excess readmissions penalties, which would reduce the need for cost shifting
at larger teaching hospitals. It is hypothesized that by controlling for the heterogeneity in
patient mix among hospitals, a more equitable readmission penalty threshold standard can
be developed that will reduce the need for hospitals to cost-shift.
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CHAPTER III
CONCEPTUAL MODEL
I. Introduction
The literature discussed in the previous chapter focused on hospital readmissions.
Building on that literature, this chapter considers the organization and structure of
hospitals. There are three main types of hospitals in the healthcare market. They are forprofit, not-for-profit, and government owned. Although the share of for-profit hospitals
has been growing (a 2.2% increase between 2006 and 2010 (AHA, 2012)), the revenue
share of not-for-profit hospitals across all U.S. hospitals still exceed 50%. According to
the 2015 American Hospital Association's annual review of Healthcare Statistics, 51.1%
of U.S. hospitals are non-governmental not-for-profit, followed by 21.5% government
owned, 18.6% for-profit, and the remaining 8.8% comprised by psychiatric, long-term
care, and prison hospitals.(AHA, 2015).
This chapter presents a brief review of hospital structures, and discussion of the
theory and behavior of these various hospital structures. A theoretical framework is then
presented to better understand the current dynamics of hospital readmissions and the
likely effect of revising the current metrics for assessing penalties for excess
readmissions.
II. Unique Nature of Medical Markets
As Arrow (1963) stated "The first step in the analysis of the medical care market
is the comparison between the actual market and the competitive model (pp 943-944)."
The demand side of the health care market diverges from the traditional competitive
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model on the basis of uncertainty in demand for medical care, asymmetric information
inherent in the physician patient relationship, and the requirement that hospitals provide
emergent care to all patients without regard of ability to pay. Building on the latter of
these traits, Arrow states "Departure from the profit motive is strikingly manifested by
the overwhelming predominance of nonprofit over proprietary hospitals (p. 950)." Stated
differently, traditional mechanisms (prices and quantities) dictating the allocation of
goods and services to their most efficient outcomes are not always apparent in the
structure of the medical care market due to institutional health care policies. In
particular, healthcare providers and hospitals receive substantial subsidies for providing
care to various groups deemed to be disadvantaged by lack of income or other factors.
Such subsidies are absent in competitive neo-classical markets.
Hospital and the medical care markets are not fully subject to traditional neoclassical supply and demand characteristics. Instead of the traditional two party system of
buyer and seller, the U.S. health care system is primarily a three party system. The three
parties include the consumer, or patient, which receives the medical care, the insurance
provider (private or public) that pays for the care, and the physician and hospital that
provide the care. The three party system differs from traditional markets where the
consumer and firm are directly linked.
The supply side of the health care markets is predominantly comprised of not-forprofit hospitals (51% in 2013). However, the diverse mix of patient needs and abilities to
pay promoted an industry structure comprised of nonprofit, for-profit, and government
owned hospitals. One explanation for this organizational structure is how hospitals arose
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to meet patient demands. As Horwitz (2005) explains, for-profit hospitals provide the
most profitable services to patients that can pay. While government owned are more
likely to offer unprofitable services, not-for-profit hospitals seek to balance the types of
services offered (Horwitz, 2005). Horwitz notes a very important aspect of the behavior
of nonprofit hospitals is the balance that must be maintained between treating patients
able to pay with patients unable to pay. The diverse mix of patients at nonprofit hospitals
is often a legal requirement for these hospitals to maintain their nonprofit status (Horwitz,
2015). The primary reason for this is that nonprofit hospitals receive governmental
subsidies to adjust for the level of uncompensated care provided. The medical care
market also diverges from traditional markets by the existence of demand for medical
care at no cost being met with supply from nonprofit hospitals.
This intricate balance of nonprofit hospitals providing care to those with and
without ability to pay raises interesting questions as to what nonprofit hospitals optimize.
Nonprofit hospitals cannot simply maximize the quantity of profitable services provided
because of the requirement to offer some quantity of unprofitable services (Horwitz,
2015). Thus, nonprofit hospitals often balance the value of prestige gained by providing
care to underinsured and uninsured patients against the cost of the prestige (Chang and
Jacobson, 2011). The notion of nonprofit hospitals motivated by prestige is revisited
later in this chapter. First, it is important to review existing theories on nonprofit
hospitals.
Provided that the market is comprised of different hospital structures, there is an
extensive literature on what these varying hospital structures seek to optimize. For-profit
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hospitals can be expected to maximize the quantity of profitable services they provide.
However, the optimization decisions for nonprofit hospitals are more complex and have
been debated in the literature for decades (Newhouse, 1970, Chang and Jacobson, 2011).
An outline of the theories governing the goals of nonprofit hospitals (i.e., what
they seek to maximize in an optimization framework), as provided by Horowitz and
Nichols (2007), is reviewed here. In 1970, Newhouse proposed a model in which
nonprofit institutions maximize output and prestige by providing additional health care
services up to the point where marginal profit is zero. Newhouse cites prior studies that
found hospitals operate optimally when they optimize the tradeoff between the quality of
care provided and the number of patients they care for within a constrained operating
budget (McNerney 1962, Long 1964).
Horowitz and Nichols then describe the role of a nonprofit hospital among other
hospital types within a geographic region. They postulate that if "...neighbors [other
hospitals] are driven more by profit motives, then the nonprofit will tend to treat less
profitable patients (p. 4, 2007)." This assertion raises the important question of how
nonprofit hospitals might behave given the diversity of hospital types within a region.
Weisebrod (2009), Salamon (1995), and Frank and Salkever (1991) all argue that
nonprofit hospitals seek to maximize the total value of care in the presence of market
failures (e.g. failure of competition through the three-party system, inadequate allocations
of resources) and governmental failures (e.g. inadequate access to care). Thus, nonprofit
hospitals are designed to satisfy unmet community health needs by providing services to
patients who generate small, zero, or negative profits. To compensate for accepting and
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treating non-profitable patients, additional revenue is generated from more profitable
services provided to patients with the ability to pay (directly or more often through
insurance coverage), a practice termed "cost shifting." The conventional definition of cost
shifting is provided by Dranove (1988) states that hospitals increase charges to privately
insured patients to offset losses from Medicaid or Medicare reimbursements.
Pauly and Redisch (1973) argue that some nonprofit hospitals are for-profit
hospitals in disguise, in that they maximize payments to "privileged employees" (hospital
executives and physicians) as a proxy for maximizing profits. Profit maximization under
a competitive equilibrium framework is Pareto efficient when social efficiency is
maximized. Pareto efficiency is reached when it is impossible to improve the welfare of
one without reducing the welfare of another (Varian 1984). The presence of cost shifting
in medical care markets foregoes Pareto efficiency through a reduction in welfare of
patients with the ability to pay for medical care as a result of covering the full cost of care
for those without the ability to pay. As Arrow alluded to, prices and quantities in the
medical care market are not always efficiently allocated. Compounding these issues, the
inefficient outcome resulting from cost shifting might also be the result of the United
State's three party healthcare system. The fact that hospitals can privately negotiate with
insurance markets allows for distorted incentives where prices vary between providers
and insurers for the same services (Wyden 2009, Hyman 2007). Because healthcare
markets are not perfectly competitive, and thereby do not efficiently allocate resources to
their highest valued use, there may be potential for Pareto improvements.
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Other theoreticians argue the optimal healthcare policy objective function should
optimize the additive sum of two health care agents. For example, Hirth (1997,1999)
presents a model in which two types of hospitals, those that seek profits and those that do
not, maximize collective hospital profit over both hospital types. Nonprofit status acts as
a signal for increased quality and may drive low-quality for-profit hospitals out of the
market. Hirth argues that low-quality for-profit hospitals attempt to exploit the market
failure of asymmetric information based on the perception that high quality institutions
charge higher prices because they provide superior care. The theory provided by Hirth
argues that some patients are poorly informed on the quality of hospitals, resulting in
'information heterogeneity'. Hirth claims that poorly informed patients are potentially
exploited by hospitals providing care of "quality which is not consistent with the price
charged" (1997). However, this theory is not useful for understanding hospital behavior
in the presence of Medicare reimbursement penalties stemming from excess hospital
readmissions because for-profit hospitals typically have lower readmission rates due to
their ability to turn down care for poor and socioeconomically disadvantaged patients
(Joynt and Jha 2013).
Hirth's key finding for our purpose is that hospitals (especially nonprofit
hospitals) seek to maximize prestige, where prestige is an increasing function of patient
numbers (Newhouse 1970). In particular, nonprofit hospitals maximize an objective
function that includes altruistic motives along with the traditional profit motives. Two
primary explanations exist for why a nonprofit hospital will maximize an objective
function that includes prestige gained from altruistic care. First is the legal requirement
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of nonprofit hospitals to provide care to the uninsured (Horwitz, 2015). The second
explanation is more theoretically ambiguous. Rosenman, Li, and Friesner (2000) posit
that nonprofit hospitals optimize prestige through maximizing revenues subject to a
constraint that it must cover cost. Doing so, with the given patient mix at nonprofit
hospitals, requires optimization to occur in one of two ways. Either the nonprofit hospital
provides higher private prices and lower public volumes, or lower private prices and
higher public volumes in response to reduced public payments (Rosenman, Li, and
Friesner 2000). This explanation demonstrates how nonprofit hospitals may shift costs
in order to optimize prestige. Furthermore, it illustrates the ability of nonprofit hospitals
to care for the uninsured (through increased prestige) while maintaining its ability to
cover costs (through cost shifting). However, their assumption that a hospital can
maximize revenue by changing multiple factors, volumes and prices to public and private
payers, might inherently suggest that the hospital is acting as a for-profit rather than nonprofit. Rosenman, Li, and Friesner's latter suggestion that hospitals may reduce private
prices in response to reduced public payments falls directly in line with the work of Hay
(1983) and Foster (1985) which state such behavior will be seen among for-profit
hospitals. To further explore how prestige maximizing hospitals function in the market
for medical care, the work done by Becker (1974) provides insight.
A reinterpretation of Gary Becker's (1974) seminal essay "A Theory of Social
Interactions" provides a unique perspective on the prestige motive. Becker posits a
"synthetic family" with a benevolent member providing charity "motivated by a desire to
improve the general well-being of recipients" (p. 1083). The charitable member is
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assumed to be motivated by social acclaim. Stated another way, charitable members are
motivated by social prestige gained from charitable actions. Becker continues by stating
that charitable members "redistribute giving until everyone losing was fully compensated
and everyone gaining was fully 'taxed' " (pp1083-1084). Becker concludes that in a
family with a charitable giver, all members would try to maximize "family" opportunity
and "family" consumption. The notion of "family" members working together implies a
degree of social interaction, which, as Becker states, is ignored by traditional neoclassical
theory. Moreover, Becker astutely notes: "Therefore, considerable ad hockery would be
required if the 'conventional' approach were to explain the evidence on charitable giving
that is more readily explained by an approach that includes social interactions" (p1085).
Expanding the scope of Becker's work, the "synthetic family" can be translated to
the market for medical care where charitable members are interpreted as nonprofit
hospitals. The nonprofit hospitals acting as charitable givers seek to maximize prestige
through redistribution by providing uncompensated care to the uninsured and
underinsured patients in need of medical care from excess revenues derived from
privately insured patients. Stated more simply, nonprofit hospitals are able to provide
"charity" care by shifting costs.
Extending Becker's work on "synthetic families" with a charitable giver did not
originally translate to the medical care market. However, Bergstrom (1995) notes Becker
borrowed concepts from the theory of the firm to explain production of his "synthetic
family." Moreover, using Becker's theory of charitable giving in the setting of a
"synthetic family" to describe the composition of hospitals in the market for medical care
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is a reasonable application of his original work. The modeling of the medical care market
needs an analytic framework that allows hospitals to be viewed as agents who optimize
prestige in the provision of uncompensated care to the underinsured and uninsured.
With the concept of nonprofit hospitals acting as prestige optimizers, a more
complete theory of cost shifting is needed to explain redistribution in the setting of
private and public payers comprising nonprofit hospital demand. Furthermore, a model
explaining cost shifting as a function of the unique patient mix at nonprofit hospitals,
coupled with the readmission discussion in Chapter II, is needed to understand the impact
on hospital reimbursements.
III. Optimization of Nonprofit Hospital Model
The behavioral model developed here allows for the possibility of cost shifting.
Hay (1983) and Foster (1985) assumed hospitals act as profit maximizing institutions
where "marketing efforts" by the hospital are used to offset reduced government
reimbursement. Consistent with prior discussion, it is assumed that hospitals do not act as
a neo-classical profit maximizer (Arrow 1963, Varian 1984, Wyden 2009, Hyman 2007).
Instead, hospitals act as price discriminators using cost-shifting to offset reductions in
government reimbursements (Hadley and Feder 1985).
Dranvoe (1988) provides the foundation of the model used in this research to
analyze the equity of current readmissions penalties. Dranove improves and builds upon
the assumption that hospitals act as price discriminators through cost-shifting in the
presence of reduced government reimbursements. He assumes that nonprofit hospitals
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serve two markets, i for private payers, and j for public payers. The hospital then chooses
prices to maximize the following utility function
(3.1)
where
j;

,

,

are prices charged to groups i and j;

,

are the costs to treat groups i and

represent the quantity of services provided to groups i and j; and

are the

profits gained from the two groups respectively (i for private payers, and j for public
payers). It is assumed that the hospital gains utility from profits in the form of monetary
profits from private payers,

, and altruistic utility, or prestige, by providing

uncompensated care from public payers (consistent with Newhouse, Becker) or
Per unit medical care cost for the two groups are assumed to be identical, i.e., the cost is
equal for resources used on a privately insured person versus a publicly insured person.
Because nonprofit hospitals cannot deny service to the publicly insured population,
exogenous.

is

is also assumed to be fixed and exogenously determined by government

payments. Collectively, these assumptions limit the choice of

as the sole means of

utility maximization in 3.1. Note that for-profit or private hospitals may choose to refuse
admittance to some individuals who could potentially be in
hospitals are unable to decline care to any individual in group

, whereas all nonprofit
or

. This assumption

is reasonable because many private hospitals have the ability to turn away the uninsured,
or patients with government (eg. Medicare, Medicaid) provided "public" insurance.
Nonprofit hospitals, which maximize utility gained from monetary profits from
private payers and prestige from public payers, are forced to balance the patient mix in
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the presence of readmission penalties. The incentive to cost shift will remain greatest in
states that have chosen to not expanded Medicaid eligibility because the proportion of
patients in group

will remain large. Ironically, many "opt-out" states serve large

proportions of poor and indigent patients (larger proportion in group

relative to

).

Moreover, the pressure on nonprofit hospitals in such states to cost shift will increase as
federal payments subsidizing the costs of uncompensated care are decreased over time.
Returning to Becker's concept of "family" and how nonprofit hospitals can be
viewed as a charitable member of the "family". Nonprofit hospitals have the ability to set
at a utility maximizing level to redistribute potential revenue shortfalls in

as a

result of less than full cost reimbursement by government (Becker, Sloan, 2000).
Theoretically, this is likely when nonprofit hospital's reimbursements are reduced due to
excess readmissions rates resulting from the high proportion of low income patients they
care for. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, defines readmission rates as
excessive when a single hospital's readmission rate exceeds the national average.
Because of the characteristics of their patients, nonprofit teaching hospitals often receive
less than full reimbursements due to high readmission rates and the financial penalty
associated with excess readmissions.
The first order condition sufficient for optimal

is satisfied where the marginal

utility of a price change equals the marginal utility from the loss of output to the private
markets (Dranove, 1988). The presence of cost shifting is demonstrated by total
differentiating the first-order condition, and restricting profits to be positive and nondecreasing in the private market; thus

which is cost shifting trade-off (Dranove,
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1988; Sloan, 2000). Allowing both

and

to vary, a theoretical hospital "...recovers

from private paying patients some of the lost profits from government patients" (Dranove,
1988). Or as Becker stated, the "charitable" nonprofit hospital seeks to maximize utility
from profits and prestige by redistributing cost among private and public payers.
Public payers (coverage through Medicare or Medicaid) and indigents (who are
unable to pay for medical services) tend to be sicker, on average, when admitted to a
hospital and thus are more likely to be readmitted. Therefore, a hospital readmission
penalty which does not account for the proportion of indigent and publicly insured
patients admitted by certain hospitals will likely result in higher readmission penalties for
hospitals serving a large proportion of indigent and publicly insured patients. To
compensate for this revenue loss, these hospitals will attempt to shift costs to offset
reduced reimbursement and gain prestige. Modifying the readmissions penalty algorithm
to control for the proportion of poor patients admitted would effectively standardize the
calculation of the critical readmission rate threshold to account for differences in patient
socio-demographic characteristics. Recalling that nonprofit hospitals represent the
majority of hospitals in the medical care market, it is appropriate to adjust the excess
readmissions penalty algorithms to account for nonprofit hospitals' large proportion of
publicly insured and uninsured patients.
Development of a more comprehensive readmissions penalty measure will level
the hospital playing field and no longer put hospitals that serve a high proportion of low
income patients at a competitive disadvantage. A change in the readmissions penalty
algorithm can be achieved by comparing excess readmission rates to stratified group
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averages as expressed by the MEDPAC report (2013) where the stratified groups are
comprised of hospitals with similar proportions of indigent and publicly insured patients.
Reducing the readmissions penalty effectively increases the reimbursement to hospitals
and reduces the incentive to shift cost to the private payers. It is hypothesized that
grouping hospitals by proportions of indigent and publicly insured patients will result in a
marginal decrease in reimbursement penalty attributable to differences in patient mix.
The development of a more comprehensive measure of calculating excess hospital
readmissions that controls for patient characteristics is necessary to accurately identify
hospitals providing sub-standard care. The improved measure is needed before the
important goal of achieving reductions in health care cost through reductions in patient
readmissions can be realized by the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP).
Traditionally, federal transfers called 'disproportionate share hospital payments'
have limited cost shifting among hospitals serving a relatively large proportion of
uninsured patients. As the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act expands insurance
coverage, there should be less uninsured patients and less uncompensated care provided
by hospitals. However in 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the Medicaid expansion
provision is a state option rather than a federal requirement. Thus, leaving large
proportions of uninsured patients in states that "opt-out" of Medicaid expansion. The
situation is complicated by reductions in payments to hospitals providing uncompensated
care when readmission rates are excessive. For example, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act contains provisions to decrease federal healthcare payments to states
in the form of reduced disproportionate share hospital payments each year from FY2014-
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FY2020. Neuhausen et al. reported that even in a state (California) that did expand
Medicaid eligibility, nonprofit hospitals were still confronted with a cost burden due to
differences in the cost of uncompensated care and the reduced disproportionate share
hospital payments (2014). Thus, states opting to expand their Medicaid program
eligibility are confronted with a potential additional cost burden, but states that did not
expand coverage are likely to face much larger cost burdens for uncompensated care.
Reductions in disproportionate share hospital payments do not account for states
choosing to expand or not expand Medicaid eligibility. As a result, hospitals in "opt-out"
expansion states are more likely to increase the degree of cost shifting through price
discrimination than states where Medicaid eligibility has been expanded. Ultimately,
until the United States moves to a single payer healthcare system, or all citizens are
provided with some universal level of insurance, there will continue to be a mix of
patients (based on ability to pay) that will necessitate the need for the nonprofit hospital
structure. Furthermore, nonprofit hospitals will continue to act as a charitable "family"
member providing healthcare to low income patients by redistributing costs among
private, public, and uninsured patients. Therefore it is imperative to adjust the
readmission penalty structures to account for these differences in patient mix.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODS
This chapter presents the methods used to analyze the effect of patient mix on
readmission rates among for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. The analysis will make use of
South Carolina state-wide database for teaching and non-teaching hospitals maintained
by the South Carolina Office of Research and Statistics. For the purposes of this analysis,
teaching hospitals serve as a proxy for nonprofit hospitals, and non-teaching hospitals
serve as a proxy for for-profit hospitals. The data can be stratified by hospital type and
patient characteristics that allows for analysis of these factors on the probability of
readmission.
The literature supports the need to stratify readmission analysis by hospital
teaching status to more accurately understand differences in the hospital-type readmission
rates (Joynt and Jha 2013, Shimizu 2014, Muller 2013, Shahian 2012). Stratification by
hospital type is necessary to control for the influence of differences in patient mix and
their hypothesized impact on pricing decisions. Chapter III outlined how prestige
optimization at nonprofit, or teaching, hospitals may lead to cost shifting as a result of
reduced public reimbursement for uncompensated care and increased readmissions rates.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), a branch of the
Department of Health and Human Services, currently assess readmission penalties by
comparing readmission rates for a given hospital to the national average by multiple
chronic disease conditions and major joint replacement categories. However, nonprofit
teaching hospitals generally have a patient mix that is poorer, lacks health insurance and
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tends to be more ill than patients cared for in other hospitals. The current CMS penalty
calculation ignores differences in hospital patient mix, which unfairly inflates the
readmission rate of otherwise high quality nonprofit teaching hospitals.
Readmission rates are estimated for the South Carolina database using the current
method of calculating excess readmissions. These results are then compared to the
readmission rates based on the method proposed by the Medicare Payment Advisory
Committee (MEDPAC, 2013), that indirectly incorporates a measure of socioeconomic
status into excess readmission calculations. Comparing the two methods for calculating
hospital readmission rates will shed light on inappropriateness of using a uniform
procedural standard that does not consider hospital type and/or patient mix when
calculating if a hospital has an excess readmission rate. Failure to control for patient mix
can result in an unfairly high excess readmission rate for hospitals that have a high
proportion of low income patients but provide very high quality patient care.

I. Data
To accurately analyze hospital readmissions, an extensive longitudinal data set
that follows patients through entire episodes of chronic illnesses is required. A large
patient population is also necessary to accurately estimate statistically significant
differences between patient subgroups with the same medical condition. Hospital
readmissions for chronic illnesses are analyzed in this study because they often require
numerous hospital admissions to treat. Prior to 2015, chronic illnesses included in the
CMS readmissions penalty calculations consisted of acute myocardial infarction (AMI),
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heart failure, and pneumonia. In 2015, readmissions penalties were expanded to include
total knee and total hip arthroplasty, as well as exacerbations of chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease.
With any disease or illness that may require hospital readmission the initial care
level and subsequent patient management are of primary importance. The Hospital
Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) is designed to improve the quality of care
provided by hospitals during the initial admission including appropriate discharge
education and out-patient care.
South Carolina hospital readmissions and the inherent quality of care provided is
analyzed using data obtained from the South Carolina Office of Research and Statistics
(ORS). The data set contains all payer hospital claims for all patients with any index
admission for an acute heart attack (AMI), heart failure, or pneumonia from January 1,
2007 through December 31, 2011 in the state of South Carolina. All payer claims refer to
complete hospitalizations for any individual regardless of insurance status. Only the data
for patients with a hospital admission for a primary diagnosis of AMI during the study
period are included in this study. For this set of patients, all other hospitalizations during
the study period are also included in the data set. The demographic variables consist of
age, race, and sex. Hospital level variables include size (measured by the number of
hospital beds), trauma status (Level 1, 2...), teaching status (yes/no), and urban or rural
location. Patient variables consist of primary diagnosis, admission source (emergency
department, direct admit, transfer), admission date, discharge date, insurance payer, and
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length of stay. If a patient died during the study period, their data is excluded. These
variables, and others included in the dataset, are fully described in Appendix C.
Several variables were created from the data set for analytical purposes, beginning
with hospital readmissions. For AMI patients, the guidelines from CMS (Center For
Medicare and Medicaid Services) and HRRP (Hospital Readmission Reduction
Program), define a readmission as a subsequent hospitalization, to the same or different
hospital, for any reason within 30 days of the initial admission with a primary diagnosis
of an acute heart attack (AMI). If a patient is readmitted more than once within the 30day period following an index hospitalization, only the first readmission is counted in the
penalty calculation. This is an important distinction related to the chronic nature of AMI
and frequency of hospitalizations. It is not uncommon for a patient to be admitted
multiple times within 30-days of an initial AMI, hence the necessity for reducing such
multiple readmissions as they are a burden on the healthcare system.
Binary variables were created to identify index hospitalizations, hospital
transfers, and readmissions within 30 days. Index hospitalization is defined as the
primary hospitalization where a patient is admitted and receives care. The primary
hospitalization may be the hospital to which a patient was transferred. Hospital transfers
are important to identify because if a patient is admitted at one hospital then transferred
to another hospital, and the second hospital treats and discharges the patient, the second
hospital is considered the index hospital. All readmissions are charged against the index
hospital. In general, only certain hospitals in South Carolina have the ability to treat AMI
patients. These patients are often transferred to teaching (nonprofit) hospitals for
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treatment. For example, a patient that suffers an acute heart attack in a rural area will be
rushed to the emergency room of a small rural hospital to be stabilized. Once the patient
is stabilized, he or she is subsequently transferred to a larger hospital with a better
capability to treat them. The second hospital is the index hospital.
A continuous variable for the time (days) to readmission was also created. All
variables and subsequent analyses were carried out using the statistical software R
(version 3.0.2, r-group). The detailed computer code is provided in Appendix A. Once
the data were arranged and organized properly, a series of iterative, multistep logical
functions were created to determine if an individual patient was transferred after an
admission for AMI (acute myocardial infarction). Similar logical functions were also
created to determine if the patient was then readmitted to any hospital within 30 days of
discharge from the previous admission, and the timing (days) between the previous
discharge and subsequent readmission.
The variables created, as well as inclusion and exclusion criteria were followed as
closely as possible to the CMS defined methods and guidelines (YNHHSC, 2014). CMS
exclusion criteria for determining hospital readmissions include index hospitalization
length of stay greater than 120 days and patients 18 years of age and older. For example,
if a patient is less than 18 years of age on admission to the hospital, or if a patient is
hospitalized longer than 120 days, they are excluded from the excess readmission
calculation.
Additionally, it is not unusual for a patient to be readmitted multiple times within
30 days for various exacerbations stemming from the index AMI admission. In such
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situations, only the first readmission within 30 days, following an index admission for
AMI is counted in the excess readmission calculation. Once the 30-day period is over, the
readmission window will only start again if there is another index admission for AMI,
and subsequent readmission. Additionally, to be counted, the patient must stay in the
hospital at least 24 hrs, or overnight, otherwise the admission is excluded. Patients that
arrive in the emergency department (ED) and are discharged, or patients admitted for
observation are not considered as readmissions for penalty calculations. For example, a
patient has an index admission for AMI and 7 days later arrives at the ED for
dehydration, or shortness of breath. This patient is considered an "outpatient" unless
he/she is admitted to a bed in the hospital. Only patients staying in the (ED) overnight, or
for longer than 24 hours are considered a readmission for penalty calculations. It has
been hypothesized (Zuckerman et al., 2016) that some hospitals attempt to circumvent
possible readmission penalties by holding these patients in "observation." For hospitals,
patients can be held in observation to monitor status without actually being admitted.
This issue is further discussed in Chapter 6.
Another CMS defined exclusion criteria concerns patients transferred from
another hospital. If a patient is transferred from another hospital, skilled nursing facility,
or any other medical care source, the initial hospitalization is not counted as a
readmission, only the index hospital that treats and discharges the patient is considered
for a possible readmission penalty. Only patients with an inpatient hospital stay that
arrived via emergency department or clinical referral (direct admit) are considered in this
analysis.

42

For a hospital to be included in the HRRP they must have at least 25 index
admissions for AMI in any three-year period. As a result, only 48 of South Carolina's 63
hospitals are represented in the AMI hospital population. (The identification code for
hospitals with 25 or more index admissions and exclusion of those hospitals with fewer is
provided in Appendix B).
Table 4.1 summarizes the demographic information for the AMI population used
in this analysis. This table represents only the index hospitalizations and demographic
information for an acute heart attack, AMI. The denominator for the reported
percentages of gender, race, transfer and payment type in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 is the
total number of index hospitalizations for each respective groups. The final data set
contains 13,793 AMI hospitalizations of which 12,875 are index AMI hospitalizations for
11,062 unique patients, with a median age of 55 years. The index AMI population is
predominantly white (71.0%), male (68.3%), with commercial insurance (42.0%).
Roughly 17.5% of the index AMI admissions in the study population resulted from a
hospital transfer. The demographics are representative of the state of South Carolina and
thus may not be reflective of national or other state averages. For payment type, the
"Other" category is comprised of workers compensation, health maintenance
organizations, health resources services administration programs, and managed care
organizations.
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Table 4.1 Patient Demographics for AMI Hospitalizations Only
No. AMI Hospitalizations
13,793
No. Index AMI Hospitalizations
12,875
No. Unique Patients
11,062
No. Hospitals
48
Age (years)
Mean ± SD*
53.3 ± 8.0
Median(IQR**)
55 (48, 60)
Male, No. (%)
8,788 (68.3)
Race, No. (%)
White
9,140 (71.0)
African-American
3,288 (25.5)
Other
447 (3.5)
Transfers, No. (%)
2,257 (17.5)
Payment Type, No. (%)
Self Payment
2,540 (19.7)
Medicare
2,567 (19.9)
Medicaid
246 (1.9)
Commercial Insurance
5,404 (42.0)
Indigent
1,155 (9.0)
Other
963 (7.5)
Note: All values in parentheses are percentages other than median age
that contains the interquartile range of 25th and 75th percentiles.
*SD= Standard deviation, **IQR= interquartile range. N=12,875, total
number of Index AMI admissions

As previously discussed, hospital readmission penalties impact nonprofit teaching
hospitals more than non-teaching hospitals due to their patient mix. In this study,
payment type is used to proxy for patient mix. Medicaid and indigent patients are
considered to be low income patients. The AMI patient population was stratified by
teaching and non-teaching hospitals, which serve as proxies for nonprofit and for-profit
hospitals.
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Table 4.2 reports the demographic characteristics for the South Carolina AMI
patient population by hospital type. The number of hospitalizations far exceeds the
number of patients because most AMI patients undergo multiple hospitalizations. All
subsequent readmissions for patients originally admitted as an AMI patient are included,
which include readmissions for any cause. The purpose of Table 4.2 is to describe the
patients and hospitalizations among teaching and non-teaching hospitals for the AMI
population. Both teaching and non-teaching AMI patients have similar average values
for age, proportion of males, and distribution by race. Due to the large sample size all
demographic variables are significantly different between hospital types (alpha level =
0.001), thus the p-values for the difference between hospital types are not reported.
A total of 5,431 index AMI hospitalizations were to teaching hospitals, compared
to 7, 444 to non-teaching hospitals. Similar to the overall index population, both teaching
and non-teaching index AMI admissions are comprised of predominantly white males
with commercial insurance.
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Table 4.2: Demographics for Patients With Any AMI Admission and All Other
Hospitalizations During the Study Period Stratified by Teaching Status
Teaching
Non-Teaching
No. All Hospitalizations
28,664
45,919
No. Index AMI Hospitalizations
5,431
7,444
No. Unique Patients
3,423
7,639
No. Hospitals
8
40
Age (years)
Mean ± SD
53.2 ± 8.0
53.4 ± 8.5
Median(IQR)
54 (47, 60)
55 (46, 59)
Male, No. (%)
3,712 (68.3)
5,076 (68.2)
Race, No. (%)
White
3,842 (70.7)
5,298 (71.2)
African-American
1,424 (26.2)
1,864 (25)
Other
165 (3.0)
282 (3.8)
Transfers, No. (%)
1,088 (20.0)
1,169 (15.7)
Payment Type, No. (%)
Self Payment
923 (17.0)
1,617 (21.7)
Medicare
1,161 (21.4)
1,406 (18.9)
Medicaid
124 (2.3)
122 (1.6)
Commercial Ins.
2,139 (39.4)
3,265 (43.9)
Indigent
718 (13.2)
437 (5.9)
Other
366 (6.7)
597 (8.0)
Note: All values in parentheses are percentages other than median age
that contains the interquartile range of 25th and 75th percentiles.
*SD= Standard deviation, **IQR= interquartile range, N=12,875, total number
of Index AMI admissions
As expected, teaching hospitals have a higher rate of transfers than non-teaching
hospitals (20.0% versus 15.7%). Furthermore, a key difference between teaching and
non-teaching hospitals is the proportion of "Indigent" patients (13.2% versus 5.9%). The
larger indigent population among teaching hospitals is because they are often nonprofit
safety-net hospitals which receive federal funding reimbursing them for treating the poor.
For-profit and non-teaching hospitals have the right to refuse care to those unable to pay.
Teaching hospitals have a slightly higher percentage (2.3%) of Medicaid patients than
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non-teaching hospitals (1.6%) and Medicaid coverage is another indication of
disadvantaged socioeconomic status.
The mix in patient types and severity of illness should be considered before
proxying hospital quality using simple average readmission rates. Although readmission
rates are adjusted for patients' comorbid conditions, the common measure for hospital
quality is their average readmission rate relative to the national average, which ignores
the hospital's patient composition (proportion of indigent, Medicare/Medicaid,
commercial insurance, etc.) However, the literature shows (Shimizu 2014, Muller 2013,
Shahian 2012), socioeconomically disadvantaged patients tend to be sicker and are
among the most likely to be readmitted to the hospital. This discrepancy results in higher
readmission rates for hospitals with a large proportion of indigent, and Medicaid patients
relative to the national average proportion.
Penalizing nonprofit teaching hospitals for excessive readmissions attributable to
uniquely different patient populations results in a flawed excess readmission rate
calculation. Penalties imposed on hospitals having an excess readmission rate, in the form
of reduced Medicare reimbursements, imposes a financial deficit on affected hospitals,
which is often filled through cost shifting. Large teaching hospitals are nonprofit
institutions that must cover costs while operating within the bounds of a fixed operating
margin (Horowitz, Nichols 2009). To maintain budget and remain within an operating
margin, hospitals negotiate pricing contracts with large insurance providers based on their
expected patient mix (Horowitz, Nichols 2009) thereby shifting losses from Medicaid and
indigent patients to privately insured patients.
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The ability of a hospital to cost-shift is especially important for South Carolina's
nonprofit teaching hospitals that price as if they are prestige optimizing, "charitable"
family members in the medical care market (Becker, 1974; Hirth, 1999). A large
indigent and Medicaid population exists in South Carolina. Therefore, the state's
nonprofit hospitals have the burden of providing uncompensated care for this population,
which is exacerbated by a flawed hospital readmission penalty calculation (Garfield et al.,
2016). Even though nonprofit teaching hospitals may gain utility through prestige of
treating the indigent population, it usually requires cost-shifting to cover cost.
Many solutions to this problem exist, perhaps the simplest being to expand
Medicaid eligibility for all individuals up to 138% of the federal poverty level (as
originally stated in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010), which would
at least, to a degree, alleviate the problem. Medicaid does not typically cover the fullcost of patient care, but it does cover a significant portion (Barr, 2011). However, in
2015, South Carolina rejected this option. Another approach to reduce the incentive for
hospitals to cost-shift is to redesign the formula that calculates excessive readmission and
the subsequent Medicare reimbursement penalties. Accepting South Carolina's
distribution of private, public, and uninsured patient as fixed, reductions in cost shifting
behavior can be made by adopting a hospital readmission penalty structure similar to the
one proposed by MEDPAC (2013).
The remainder of this chapter presents the methods for comparing nonprofit and
for profit hospitals as a function of teaching status. The analytic foundation for
comparing hospital readmission rates and penalties for excess readmissions is presented.
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This information is then used to determine how the hospital readmission rate is affected
by patient mix at each hospital type.

II. Statistical Methods
Using the patient demographic data and hospital level data, a standard logistic
regression model and resulting odds ratios are calculated to determine how various
demographic and hospital characteristics impact the likelihood of readmission.
Readmission to the hospital is represented by (

), where

, such that
(4.1)

where

is a vector of predictor variables (

captures the impact of changes in

on

and associated parameters (

that

(Green 2003). From equation 4.1, the

likelihood function
(4.2)
is maximized where

when

, or

when

. A forward

step-wise regression technique was used to determine a model that can no longer be
improved by adding an additional predictor variable (Hocking 1976). To interpret the
impact of the independent predictor variables on the probability of hospital readmission
the odds ratios are calculated using the estimated coefficients

Hosemer-Lemeshow

test is used to determine goodness of fit for the logistic regression (Hosemer et al. 2013)
To evaluate the possible time sensitive reasons for hospital readmissions (and
hence excessive or penalized readmissions from policy and cost viewpoints), a Cox
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Proportional Hazards model is employed to estimate hazard ratios for the various
socioeconomic factors influencing hospital readmission. The specification of the semiparametric Cox Proportion Hazards model requires selecting a set of covariates that are
multiplicatively related to the hazard ratio (Greene 2003). The baseline hazard rate
represented by

, is
.

(4.3)

Equation (4.3) allows for estimation of

for a vector of covariates. Now assume that K

unique readmission times exist,

, where

. Next assume
readmitted in at least time
being readmitted at time

is a specific number of days and

is the risk set containing all individuals who have not been
days, ∀ i

where

. The probability of a patient

, given that exactly one patient has been readmitted at this

time is
(4.4)
Equation (4.4) allows for the estimation of the partial likelihood function,
(4.5)
in which exactly one individual exits at each distinct time with no censored observations
(Green 2003). However if multiple individuals

exit at distinct time intervals, then the

log-likelihood function represents the sum of terms for each individual patient.
Estimating the partial likelihood function in (4.5) allows for estimation of the hazard
ratios for the covariates in relation to time to hospital readmission. The analysis
presented here is a standard Cox Proportional Hazards model applied to the context of
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hospital readmissions (Greene 2003). Results of the hazard ratios, presented in Chapter
V, estimate the effect of the demographic variables, teaching status, and insurance status
have on the time to readmission.
The study data uses two approaches to estimate the excess readmission rate and
subsequent reimbursement penalty. The first approach is suggested in the MEDPAC
report and the second uses the current CMS policy. The MEDPAC report hypothesizes
that the current CMS risk adjusting methodology, which does not include a
socioeconomic adjustment for patient characteristics, excessively penalizes hospitals with
an above average proportion of poor patients. The MEDPAC study found that low
income is a more consistent predictor of hospital readmission than age, sex, or race.
Therefore adjusting readmissions rates for income status should result in a more
meaningful standardized comparison (MEDPAC, 2013). It is also hypothesized that a
superior estimate for standardized hospital readmission average rates will reduce
reimbursement penalties for teaching hospitals and thus, reduce the degree of cost
shifting to privately insured patients.
The statewide data used for this study does not contain a measure of
socioeconomic status. Thus to compare hospitals in a similar manner to the MEDPAC
report, the data are stratified by the proportion of indigent and Medicaid patients a
hospital serves. The MEDPAC report proxies socioeconomic status using the proportion
of patients at each hospital on Supplemental Security Income (SSI), stratified into deciles,
however that data is not available for this study. Thus, the proportion of poor (indigent
and Medicaid) patients served by each hospital is used to proxy for socioeconomic status
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in this study. Each patient's "method of payment" is used to proxy for socioeconomic
status. Poor patients are defined as patients who are either indigent (unable to pay) or
patients on Medicaid, which is government subsidized health insurance coverage for
unemployed and those with very low income. To calculate the proportion of poor patients
a hospital serves, the sum of indigent and Medicare patients was divided by total hospital
admissions in each hospital. Using a procedure similar to the MEDPAC report, Each of
the 48 South Carolina hospitals in the AMI data set were then stratified into quintiles
based on the proportion of poor patients they treated to create appropriate groups for
analysis. Table 4.3 provides the quintiles, number of hospitals, and range of the
proportions of poor patients served. These quintiles will serve as individual comparison
groups, whereby each hospital's readmission rate will be compared to the quintile
average, in addition to the statewide average under the original CMS protocol.
Table 4.3: Quintiles by Proportion of Poor Patients
Proportion Poor Patients*
Quintile
No. Hospitals
(%)
1
9
4.74 - 7.52
2
9
7.69 - 9.49
3
10
9.57 - 11.15
4
10
11.31 - 15.64
5
10
15.68 - 21.55
* Ranges for the proportion of poor patients, calculated as
the proportion of Indigent and Medicaid AMI patients
served by the hospital during the study period.
The stratification of the 48 South Carolina hospitals into quintiles shown in Table
4.3 will serve as the basis of the group level comparison of readmission rates presented in
the forest plots in Chapter V (Figures 5.2-5.6). While Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show rates of
Indigent and Medicaid to be much lower than these proportions, it is important to note

52

that these are the proportions of Indigent and Medicaid at any one specific hospital,
which are then stratified into quintiles.
In the next chapter, a series of forest plots are constructed to analyze the overall
and quintile hospital readmission rates. A hospital is determined to have 'excess
readmissions' if the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for its readmission rate is
above the state-wide average (original CMS method), or quintile group average
(MEDPAC, quintile level method). The quintile-level results are then compared to the
average state-wide excess readmission rate. Table 4.3 reports the proportion of poor
patients for the 48 hospitals across quintile groups.
The two procedures presented here are used to determine when a hospital
readmission rate is excessive. By comparing two methods for determining excess
readmission rates, light will be shed on the degree to which 'excess' readmissions are
driven by the population share of low income patients a hospital cares for. The
calculation of excess hospital readmissions as determined by the two approaches is a
secondary outcome. The primary outcome is the amount of the penalty, which is a
function of the estimated readmission rate. It is not the fact of being penalized that is of
importance, but rather the amount of the penalty that can be hypothetically attributed to
the proportion of poor patients a hospital serves. The dollar value penalty a hospital
receives is a function of having an excess readmission rate and the difference between the
hospitals estimated readmission rate and the reference readmission rate. When the
reference rate is changed due to an alternative means of estimating excess readmission
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(state-wide readmission rate versus the quintile-level readmission rate) the dollar value of
the penalty changes.
Due to the loss of independence by using each hospital's readmission data to
estimate an single aggregate state-wide readmission rate to which each hospital was then
compared to, additional analysis was conducted to decouple individual hospitals from the
aggregate state-wide readmission rate. The loss of independence here is that the weighted
average state-wide readmission rate is comprised of each of the 48 hospital's data, to
which the individual hospitals are compared for penalty determination. Thereby making
the aggregate state-wide average dependent upon each hospital's readmission data. To
evaluate the empirical analysis, each of the 48 hospital's readmission rates were resampled with replacement 1,000 times using nonparametric bootstrapping methods1. The
resulting 1,000 bootstrapped readmission rates were built using each hospital's sample
size (the number of index AMI admissions), and the empirical readmission rate.
Additionally, 95% confidence intervals were estimated for each of the 1,000 estimated
readmission rates for all 48 hospitals. The bootstrapping process allows for analysis of
the 48,000 bootstrapped hospital samples to be compared to 1,000 state-wide averages, as
well as 5,000 quintile group averages (1,000 for each quintile) as a means of evaluating
the empirical analysis. Sample code outlining these processes can be found in Appendix
D. Creating 1,000 state-wide readmission rates for comparison was done to mitigate the
loss of independence present in the empirical analysis.

1

R package "bootstrap"
Note: "other insurance" category is comprised of workers compensation, health maintenance
organizations, health resources services administration programs, and managed care organizations.
3
The primary reason for using 5 years of data rather than 3 is because the data used in this study contains
2
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While these bootstrapping techniques are built on the empirical data, the process
allows for retesting the study hypothesis. Consistent with the initial hypothesis, the
hypothesis tested with the boot-strapped samples is that the quintile method, which
controls for patient socio-economic factors (income), will result in a lower excess
readmission rate than using the state-wide average rate as the frame of reference for
determining excess hospital readmission rates. Thus, the excess readmission penalty will
be less with the quintile method. Testing the hypothesis using the 1,000 bootstrapped
samples allows for a more robust analysis than if only the collected data set was used to
empirically test the maintained hypothesis. If the resulting bootstrapped analysis reveals a
similar pattern of readmission rates, and shows similar reduction in excess readmission
related penalties from the state-wide average compared to the quintile level averages,
then the empirical results can be accepted with greater confidence.
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CHAPTER V
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
I. Introduction
An accurate calculation of a hospital's readmission rate is critical to the success of
the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP). The hospital readmission rate
determines whether or not a hospital has excess readmissions, and the degree to which
the hospital is financially penalized. In fiscal year 2013, the maximum Medicare
reimbursement penalty was 1% for excess readmissions. The maximum penalty was
increased to 2% in fiscal year 2014 and further increased to 3% in 2015. The number of
diagnostic categories subject to excess readmissions penalties has been increasing. In
2015, hospitals can be penalized for excess readmissions for patients with acute
myocardial infarction (AMI), heart failure, pneumonia, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, total knee arthroplasty, and total hip arthroplasty. With the potential for
penalties being assessed in each of these categories, it is imperative to accurately
determine a standard hospital readmission rate for each diagnostic category by
controlling for patient characteristics.
Extensive discussion in prior chapters pertaining to differences in hospital
structure and patient composition highlight the importance of these factors in estimating
excess hospital readmission penalties. Chapter III provides insight into optimization
decisions among for-profit and nonprofit hospitals and how these optimization decisions
are driven by patient mix. Nonprofit hospitals care for higher proportions of Medicaid
and indigent patients than for-profit hospitals, which indicate they incorporate prestige in
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their optimized decision. Here, prestige is a function of the quantity and quality of care
provided to those without regard for ability to pay. The notion of prestige differs from
optimization at for-profit hospitals that maximize profits as a function of increased
patient numbers. The disparities in patient mix are documented in chapter IV for a sample
of South Carolina hospitals that revealed a significantly higher proportion of indigent
patients admitted to teaching hospitals than nonteaching hospitals (8.9% versus 3.2%).
Incorporating a measure of patient composition into excess readmissions penalties may
reduce cost shifting among nonprofit teaching hospitals.
To test this hypothesis, excess readmission rates are analyzed under the existing
national average method as well as the method proposed in the MEDPAC (2013) report.
The MEDPAC report represents the collaborative efforts of The Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Yale New Haven Health Services Corporation to
design an improved readmission measure for determining hospital quality (YNHHS,
2014). The following analysis adheres to these guidelines as closely as possible to
accurately identify hospitals with excessive readmissions in the South Carolina data base.

II. Results
A logistic regression analysis was conducted to determine which demographic
and hospital level factors influence the likelihood of readmission. The resulting odds
ratios and 95% confidence intervals of the logistic regression are presented in Table 5.1.
The Hosmer-Lemeshow test indicated that the logistic regression model is well calibrated
and correctly specified (p-value=0.989).
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The condition number (a diagnostic tool testing for the existence of
multicollinearity, or high correlation between predictor variables) in the logistic
regression is 15.64, which indicates the model does not suffer from multicollinearity
among the independent variables. Multicollinearity in regression analysis can be a
problem when strong correlation among predictor variables highly influences the
coefficient estimates. In the logistic regression model presented in Table 5.1, age is not
included in the model due to strong correlation with Medicare (correlation coefficient of
0.874). Including age in the regression results in a condition number of 712.3, indicating
strong multicollinearity (any condition number greater than 30 is indicative of
multicollinearity (Pesaran, 2015)). Running the two models side by side, one including
age and one without, provides a comparison of the impacts of multicollinearity. R code
for each regression is found in Appendix H. Removing the age variable eliminates
multicollinearity while leaving coefficients of other predictor variables relatively
unchanged; an indication that multicollinearity existed in the previous model, yet it had
very little impact on the model as a whole. Additionally, while the coefficients and odds
ratios were relatively unchanged the standard errors were shown to be reduced by
removing the multicollinearity. A matrix of correlation coefficients among the
independent variables in the logistic regression is presented in Appendix D.
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Table 5.1 Odds Ratios and 95% Confidence Intervals for 30-Day AMI
Readmissions
Odds Ratio
95% Confidence Interval
Intercept*
0.1616
(0.1204, 0.2146)
Female*
1.1494
(1.0496, 1.2581)
Self-Payer
0.8898
(0.7379, 1.0765)
Medicare*
1.4586
(1.2182, 1.7531)
Medicaid*
1.4746
(1.0767, 2.0058)
Commercial Insurance
0.8889
(0.7485, 1.0604)
Indigent
1.0465
(0.8456, 1.2967)
White
1.0871
(0.8538, 1.4014)
African American
1.2652
(0.9854, 1.6433)
Teaching Hospital*
1.4015
(1.2849, 1.5284)
*Variables significant at alpha =0.05 include the intercept, female,
Medicare, Medicaid, and teaching hospitals indicated by a 95% confidence
interval not containing the value of one. N= 12,875, the number of Index
AMI Hospitalizations
Results presented in Table 5.1 show that publicly funded Medicaid and Medicare
patients are much more likely to be readmitted (47% and 46% more likely) than "other
insurance" patients2. Females in South Carolina are 15% more likely than males to be
readmitted to the hospital following an admission for AMI. Additionally, one of the most
important statistical results is that patients at teaching hospitals are 40% more likely to be
readmitted than patients at non-teaching hospitals. This result can be partly explained by
the differences in the mix of insurance providers and severity of illness among patients
cared for at teaching hospitals compared to non-teaching hospitals (Mueller et al. 2013,
and Shahian et al. 2012, Philbin et al 2001, Shimizu et al. 2014). These findings set up
the comparative analysis between teaching and non-teaching hospitals throughout the
remainder of this chapter.
2

Note: "other insurance" category is comprised of workers compensation, health maintenance
organizations, health resources services administration programs, and managed care organizations.
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A more comprehensive logistic regression model could either include hospital
teaching status as random effect, or as an interaction term with Indigent and Medicaid.
This might provide more evidence to support the hypothesis that the patient composition
among teaching hospitals is associated with increased likelihood of readmissions.
Furthermore, the Medicare variable could be stratified into 2 populations, the standard 65
and older population, and the less than 65 population with serious disabilities or
comorbid health conditions.
Table 5.2 reports the overall hospital readmissions rates and timing (in days) to
readmission for the 48 hospitals in the data set. Data represented in Table 5.2 show the
crude number readmitted as well as the percentage readmission and time to readmission
(measured in days). The focus of this table is a descriptive analysis of the readmitted
population, and shows how readmission rates differ by gender, race, and insurance
payment type, as well as how the time to readmission might differ among those
categories.
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Table 5.2: Index AMI Readmissions Rates and Timing for all South
Carolina Hospitals
N
Readmission
Timing
(Admitted)
(%)
(days)
Overall
12,875
19.7
14.5 ± 8.8
Range Among Hospitals
2.6 - 28.2
0 - 30
Male
8,788
18.7
14.7 ± 8.7
Female
4,087
21.8
14.1 ± 8.9
Race
White
9,140
18.8
14.5 ± 8.8
African-American
3,288
22.6
14.5 ± 8.7
Other
447
16.8
13.0 ± 9.0
Payment Type
Self Payment
2,540
17.7
14.1 ± 8.6
Medicare
2,567
26.5
14.6 ± 8.9
Medicaid
246
28.5
13.2 ± 8.8
Commercial Insurance
5,404
17.1
14.7 ± 8.9
Indigent
1,155
20.3
14.4 ± 9.0
Other
963
18.5
14.0 ± 8.8
All timing values other than range are reported as Mean ± SD, in days.
N= 12,875, the number of Index AMI admissions.

Across all 48 hospitals, the arithmetic mean readmission rate for AMI patients is
19.7%, and individual hospital readmission rates range from 2.6 % to 28.2%. When
stratified by gender, females are readmitted more frequently than men (21.8% versus
18.7%). African-Americans have the highest readmission rate at 22.6%, followed by
whites at 18.8%, and all other race/ethnicity classes at 16.8%.
Insurance status provides an interesting breakdown of readmissions rates. The
self-payer readmission rate and the commercial insurance readmission rate are the two
lowest rates at 16.5% and 16.9%. Medicare patients have the second highest readmission
rate of 25.9%, most likely because these patients are usually older and often seriously ill.
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Patients receiving Medicare are usually 65 years of age or older, except for patients with
certain disabilities, including end stage renal disease, Lou Gehrig's disease, and patients
receiving Social Security Disability Insurance Payments, who receive coverage
regardless of age (Barr, 2011). Medicaid patients are readmitted most frequently at
27.8%. Indigent patients have the third highest readmission rate of 20.1%. Medicaid
patients and the indigent are poorer, often sicker patients with higher than average
readmission rates. Medicaid and indigent patient status is used to proxy for low income
socioeconomic status in this analysis.
Time to readmission was calculated to determine if there is a difference in time to
readmission by payment type, where payment type is a proxy for patient mix. Average
time to readmission across most groups is roughly 14 days, with the exception of
Medicaid patients who are readmitted one day earlier on average.
Hospital-level readmissions rates and time to readmission across demographic
groups for teaching and non-teaching hospitals are reported in Table 5.3. Pearson's chisquared tests are used to determine differences in readmission rate between teaching
hospitals and non-teaching hospitals across the demographic variables. Student's t-test are
used to determine differences in time to readmission across the reported demographic
variables. Any p-value < 0.05 is considered to be statistically significant. Similar to
results regarding AMI readmissions, there is not a significant statistical difference
between teaching and non-teaching hospitals with regard to the average number of days
to readmission. Neither demographic nor insurance considerations affect the length of
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time to readmission between the two hospital types. This general result is further
analyzed using the Cox Proportional Hazards model.
An example interpretation of Table 5.3, out of all Male index AMI admissions to
teaching hospitals, 782, or 21.1% were readmitted. All other values can be interpreted in
a similar manner.
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Table 5.3: Percent Readmissions and Average Timing To Readmission for Teaching and Non-Teaching Hospitals Index AMI Hospitalizations
Teaching (N=8)

Non-Teaching (N=40)

P-values

N
(Admitted)

Readmission
(%)

Timing
(days)

N
(Admitted)

Readmission
(%)

Timing
(days)

Readmission
(%)

Timing
(days)

5,431

22.2

14.4 ± 9.0

7,444

18.0

14.6 ± 8.6

< 0.001

0.346

-

13.2 - 24.2

0 - 30

-

2.6 - 28.2

0 - 30

-

-

Male

3,712

21.1

14.4 ± 9.0

5,076

16.5

14.9 ± 8.6

0.001

0.336

Female

1,719

24.2

14.0 ± 9.2

2,368

20.1

14.2 ± 8.6

< 0.001

0.710

White

3,842

21.4

14.5 ± 9.1

5,298

16.9

14.5 ± 8.6

<0.001

0.910

African-American

1,424

24.0

14.0 ± 8.8

1,864

21.5

15.0 ± 8.5

0.097

0.112

165

20.0

12.6 ± 9.4

282

14.9

13.5 ± 9.0

0.207

0.576

923

19.8

14.0 ± 8.8

1,617

16.5

14.2 ± 8.5

0.036

0.856

Medicare

1,161

27.6

14.3 ± 9.0

1,406

25.7

14.8 ± 8.7

0.302

0.529

Medicaid

124

37.1

13.9 ± 8.8

122

19.7

12.0 ± 9.0

0.004

0.382

2,139

19.0

14.2 ± 9.1

3,265

15.9

15.1 ± 8.6

0.004

0.134

718

23.4

14.9 ± 9.1

437

15.1

13.2 ± 8.8

< 0.001

0.194

Overall
Range Among Hospitals

Race

Other
Payment Type
Self Payment

Commercial Insurance
Indigent

Other
366
20.5
13.7 ± 9.5
597
17.3
14.0 ± 8.2
0.242
0.711
Note: "other insurance" category is comprised of workers compensation, health maintenance organizations, health resources services
administration programs, and managed care organizations. N= 12,875, the number of Index AMI admissions, 5,431 at Teaching Hospitals,
7,444 at Non-Teaching Hospitals
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Medicaid and indigent patients were readmitted in higher proportions with more
variability in time to readmission than patients with other insurance providers as shown
in Table 5.3. Table 5.3 also reveals that Medicaid (p-value=0.004) and indigent patients
(p-value < 0.001) have higher readmission rate at teaching hospitals than non-teaching
hospitals. Other forms of insurance payment, including commercial insurance, do not
show significant differences in readmission rates between teaching and non-teaching
hospitals. Differences in readmission rates for the Medicaid populations is roughly 17.4%
(37.1%-19.7%), and 8.3% (23.4%-15.1%) for the indigent populations, compared to less
than 5% for all other forms of insurance payment between teaching and non-teaching
hospitals. The overall readmission rate is significantly higher at teaching hospitals
(22.1%) than non-teaching hospitals (18.0%, p-value < 0.001). Based on the literature
(Mueller 2013, Shahian 2012, Philbin 2001, Lindenauer 2013) and the analysis
presented here, the difference in readmission rates between teaching and non-teaching
hospitals is likely to be partially attributable to patient mix and not exclusively hospital
quality.
The results in Table 5.3 support the hypothesis that exogenous differences in
patient mix between nonprofit teaching hospitals and non-teaching hospitals influence the
rate of readmission for a given illness. The dominant driver in the readmission rate
difference between hospital types is likely attributable to the differences in patient mix
between teaching versus non-teaching hospitals. Statistical support for this statement is
found in the significant differences in readmission rates for the poorer patient classes
(Medicaid, and indigent insurance provider) than patients in higher income classes. The
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limited number of hospitals studied, 8 teaching and 40 non-teaching, presents a statistical
limitation which is addressed later in this chapter. The prior descriptive analysis presents
a strong case to modify the current hospital penalty calculations for excess readmission
rates fail to account for differences in exogenous patient mix.
Due to the similarity in timing of readmission across most demographic and
teaching categories as presented in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, a Cox Proportional Hazards model
was estimated to disentangle the relationship between demographic characteristics and
time to patient readmission. The resulting hazard ratios and 95% confidence intervals for
this analysis is presented in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Cox Proportional Hazards Results for Time to
Readmission
Hazard
95% Confidence
Ratio
Interval
Age
0.9964
(0.9914, 1.0014)
Male
0.9753
(0.8997, 1.0573)
White
0.9192
(0.7335, 1.152)
Black
0.9252
(0.7332, 1.1675)
Self Pay
0.9674
(0.8144, 1.1492)
Medicare
0.9442
(0.8012, 1.1128)
Medicaid
1.0469
(0.798, 1.3735)
Commercial Insurance
0.9074
(0.7746, 1.0629)
Indigent
0.9117
(0.7513, 1.1062)
Teaching Hospital
0.9840
(0.9099, 1.0642)
Note: All estimates are insignificant at alpha = 0.05 level.
N= 12,875, the number of Index AMI Hospitalizations
For each included variable in the Cox Proportional Hazards model, the null
hypothesis is that each categorical variable does not affect the timing of readmission.
Failure to reject the null hypothesis is illustrated by a 95% confidence interval containing
the value of one. The alternative hypothesis is that there is an impact, either positive or
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negative, is represented by a 95% confidence interval either entirely above or below the
value of one. Hazard ratios represent the ratio of readmission rates corresponding to the
levels of the explanatory variables. The Cox Proportional Hazards model indicates that
the timing of patient readmissions to the hospital are not influenced by the analyzed
demographic factors or by hospital teaching status because the 95% confidence intervals
for the calculated hazard ratios all contain the value of one. These findings support
Dharmarajan et al. (2013) where no significant difference was found in the rate, or
timing, of readmissions when analyzed by demographic characteristics.
While the timing of a readmission may not be correlated to socioeconomic factors
or hospital teaching status, the logistic regression results indicate that socioeconomic
factors and hospital teaching status do contribute to likelihood of readmission. The latter
is the most relevant with regard to possible policy changes. For a given hospital deemed
to have "excess" readmission which would result in a reimbursement penalty, as
discussed in chapters I and II, the lower bound on the 95% confidence interval for the
hospital readmission rate must exceed the national hospital readmission average
(YNHHSC, 2014). Hospitals are penalized when their readmission rates for any
diagnosis category (acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, pneumonia, chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease, total knee arthroplasty, and total hip arthroplasty) exceed
the national average rate. In the subsequent analysis, excess readmission rates are subject
to the penalty structure provided by Yale New Haven Health Services (2014), for South
Carolina hospitals with excess AMI readmissions.
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Appendix E reports the summary data for the 48 South Carolina hospital's AMI
admissions, the number of AMI readmissions, the proportion of AMI readmissions and
the percentage of poor patients. Appendices E and F provide summary data used in the
following forest plots and quintile analysis reported in this chapter. In this analysis,
under current protocol, a hospital is considered to have an excess readmission rate if a
hospital's lower bound for the 95% confidence interval for its AMI readmission rate is
above the state-wide average. Here, the state-wide average is the total number of 30-day
readmissions divided by the total number of index AMI admissions for the state (19.0%).
The statewide average is a weighted average based on the number of AMI patients each
hospital treats relative to the total number of AMI patients in the state. Using the
weighted average for these comparisons is considered superior to a simple numeric
average across all individual hospital rates because it takes into account differences in the
number of AMI admissions in each of the 48 hospitals, which ranges from 33 to 1,476.
Appendix F reports both methods of calculating the reference average readmission rates
relative to the percentage of poor patients in each quintile. Under the proposed
MEDPAC protocol, a hospital is considered to have an excess readmission rate if the
hospital's lower bound for the 95% confidence interval for its AMI readmission rate is
above its quintile average. The 95% confidence intervals are calculated using the
standard calculation for a sample proportion.
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Figure 5.1: Forest Plot of all Hospital Readmission Rates and 95% Confidence Intervals.

Note: Each horizontal line represents the readmission rate (black box) and 95%
confidence interval of each hospital as indicated by the vertical axis. The vertical red line
represents the weighted average state wide readmission rate =19.03%. Penalized hospitals
are represented by hospitals whose entire 95% confidence interval is to the right of the
vertical red line.
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The average readmission rate for the analyzed South Carolina hospitals is 19.0% ,
and is denoted by the vertical red line in Figure 5.1. The horizontal axis for Figure 5.1
through Figure 5.6 is readmission rate, and the vertical axis represents hospitals by
identification number. Among the 48 analyzed hospitals, 8 are teaching hospitals and 40
are non-teaching hospitals. The readmission rate for these 48 hospitals range from 2.6%
to 28.2%. Applying the standard CMS approach (comparison to the state-wide
readmission rate) reveals that 7 (14.6%) of the 48 hospitals have excess readmissions
(i.e., the lower confidence interval bound for each of the hospitals exceeds the state-wide
rate of 19.0%) and would incur reimbursement penalties under the current excess hospital
readmission methodology. Recall, under the CMS methodology, the reference
readmission rate is the nation-wide average rate. Given that only state-wide data is
available, this study substitutes the state-wide readmission rate for the national reference
rate. Another difference in this analysis is the readmission data for South Carolina's AMI
population spans the years 2007-2011, whereas the CMS procedure calculates the nationwide readmission rate on a 3 year moving average basis3. Of the 7 South Carolina
hospitals that would be penalized under existing CMS methodology when the average
state-wide rate is used as the reference, four are teaching hospitals (4 out of 8) and three
(3 out of 40) are non-teaching hospitals. Thus, 50.0% of teaching hospitals have excess
readmission rates compared to only 7.5% of non-teaching hospitals when the unadjusted
state-wide average rate is used to determine excess readmission.

3

The primary reason for using 5 years of data rather than 3 is because the data used in this study contains
all payers rather than a true Medicare database. Moreover, the data base used here contains a sample of
Medicare patients in South Carolina rather than all Medicare hospitalizations.

70

Current CMS protocol does not include any measure of socioeconomic status, a
risk adjustment procedure, when estimating excess hospital readmission rates and
subsequently assessing reimbursement penalties. Historically, a major reason for not
including an adjustment for patient mix, is the belief that a socioeconomic patient
adjustment will mask differences among hospitals and reduce hospital incentives to
improve the quality of care for vulnerable populations (YNHHSC, 2014). While this
may be a valid point, the issue is much larger than the quality of care provided to this
"vulnerable" population. The population of poor patients arrives at various hospitals in
an exogenously heterogeneous manner. Thus, the current method of calculating excess
readmission penalties negatively impacts larger teaching hospitals to a greater degree due
to inherent characteristics of their patients beyond their control.
Chapter II reviewed the Medicare Payment Advisory Committee (MEDPAC,
2013) report, which outlined an alternative method for adjusting readmission penalties to
include the proportion of poor patients served by a hospital. The authors of this report
found that the share of low-income patients is a strong predictor of hospital readmissions.
Thus, in this study, the percentage of poor patients (i.e., indigent and Medicaid patients)
at each hospital were stratified into quintiles (as reported in Table 4.3) to proxy for and
isolate the relationship between the share of low income patients and hospital
readmission rate.
An overall readmission rate for each of the five quintiles was calculated. Each
hospital's average readmission rate and 95% confidence interval was calculated and
compared to the weighted quintile average readmission rate the hospital belonged to, to
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determine if the hospital had an excess rate of readmissions relative to similar hospitals.
The first quintile summarizes the AMI readmission values for hospitals having the lowest
proportion of poor patients, and the fifth quintile summarizes the AMI readmission rates
for hospitals with the highest proportion of low income patients.
Figure 5.2: Forest Plot for Quintile 1 (Hospitals with the lowest proportion of poor
patients) Hospital Readmission Rates and 95% Confidence Intervals

*

Note: Quintile 1 represents hospitals with the lowest proportion of poor patients (Indigent
and Medicaid) in South Carolina. The proportion of low income patients in quintile 1
ranged from 4.74% to 7.52%. Each horizontal line represents the readmission rate (black
box) and 95% confidence interval of each hospital as indicated by the vertical axis. The
vertical red line represents the first quintile weighted average readmission rate of 16.89%.
Penalized hospitals are represented by hospitals whose entire 95% confidence interval is
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to the right of the red line. *Denotes hospitals deemed to have excessive readmission
rates based on the quintile approach.
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Figure 5.2 uses a forest plot to report the confidence intervals for the 9 hospitals
in the first quintile. The percentage of poor patients served by hospitals in the first
quintile range from 4.74% to 7.52%. The 9 hospitals had an overall weighted average
readmission rate of 16.89%, as indicated by the vertical red line. Of the 9 hospitals, only
one (Non-Teaching Hospital 33) had a readmission rate where the lower bound of the
95% confidence interval was above the average quintile readmission rate of 16.89%
deeming that hospital to have excess readmissions (i.e., the one hospitals with its
confidence interval entirely to the right of the vertical red line). The one teaching hospital
in this quintile did not have excess readmissions using the quintile criteria.
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Figure 5.3: Forest Plot for Quintile 2 (hospitals with the second lowest proportion of poor
patients) Hospital Readmission Rates and 95% Confidence Intervals

*
*
*

Note: Quintile 2 represents hospitals with the second lowest proportion of poor patients
(Indigent and Medicaid) in South Carolina. The proportion of low income patients in the
second quintile ranged from 7.69% to 9.49%. Each horizontal line represents the
readmission rate (black box) and 95% confidence interval of each hospital as indicated by
the vertical axis. The vertical red line represents the second quintile weighted average
readmission rate of 20.37%. Penalized hospitals are represented by hospitals whose entire
95% confidence interval is to the right of the red line. *Denotes hospitals deemed to have
excessive readmission rates based on the quintile approach.
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The forest plot in Figure 5.3 displays readmission rates and confidence intervals
for the second quintile that includes those hospitals with between 7.69% and 9.49%
Medicaid or indigent patients. The second quintile also includes 9 hospitals and the
overall weighted average readmission rate is 20.37%. Of the 9 hospitals, three (NonTeaching Hospitals 38 and 39, and Teaching Hospital 8) have excess readmission rates
relative to the quintile rate, including one teaching hospital. Unexpectedly, the second
quintile has the highest readmission rate among the five quintiles despite the fact that this
quintile has a relatively low proportion of Medicaid and indigent patients. This anomaly
is likely a function of the state-wide data presented here rather than reflective of a nationwide dataset. As the MEDPAC (2013) report to Congress showed, readmission rates are
directly correlated to the proportion of poor patients with each group level readmission
rate increasing as the proportion of poor patients increases. It is assumed that there will
be a stronger positive correlation between readmission rates and the proportion of
Medicaid and indigent patients as sample size increased from state-wide data to a
nationally representative database. If this not the result, then additional research will be
needed to explain this unexpected outcome.
The forest plot in Figure 5.4 displays readmission rates and confidence intervals
for the third quintile that represents hospitals with a proportion of Medicaid and indigent
patients ranging from 9.57% to 11.15%. The third quintile contains 10 hospitals with an
average weighted readmission rate of 19.43%. Of the 10 hospitals in this quintile, two
have excess readmission rates, both are teaching hospitals (Hospital 6 and Hospital 7.)
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Figure 5.4: Forest Plot for Quintile 3 (hospitals with the third lowest proportion of poor
patients) Hospital Readmission Rates and 95% Confidence Intervals

*

*

Note: Quintile 3 represents hospitals with the third lowest proportion of poor patients
(Indigent and Medicaid) in South Carolina. The proportion of low income patients in the
third quintile ranged from 9.57% to 11.15%. Each horizontal line represents the
readmission rate (black box) and 95% confidence interval of each hospital as indicated by
the vertical axis. The vertical red line represents the third quintile weighted average
readmission rate of 19.43%. Penalized hospitals are represented by hospitals whose entire
95% confidence interval is to the right of the red line. *Denotes hospitals deemed to have
excessive readmission rates based on the quintile approach.
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The forest plot illustrated in Figure 5.5 displays readmission rates and confidence
intervals for the fourth quintile that represents hospitals having a proportion of Medicaid
and indigent patients between 11.31% to 15.64%. The fourth quintile includes 10
hospitals that have an average weighted readmission rate of 18.30%. Among the 10
hospitals, one (Non-Teaching Hospital 40) has an excess readmission rate relative to the
quintile average rate.
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Figure 5.5: Forest Plot for Quintile 4 (hospitals with the second highest proportion of
poor patients) Hospital Readmission Rates and 95% Confidence Intervals

*

Note: Quintile 4 represents hospitals with the second highest proportion of poor patients
(Indigent and Medicaid) in South Carolina. The proportion of low income patients in the
fourth quintile ranged from 11.31% to 15.64%. Each horizontal line represents the
readmission rate (black box) and 95% confidence interval of each hospital as indicated by
the vertical axis. The vertical red line represents the fourth quintile weighted average
readmission rate of 18.3%. Penalized hospitals are represented by hospitals whose entire
95% confidence interval is to the right of the red line. *Denotes hospitals deemed to have
excessive readmission rates based on the quintile approach.

79

Figure 5.6 displays the forest plot of readmission rates and confidence intervals
for the fifth quintile that represents hospitals with the highest proportion of Medicaid and
indigent patients. The proportion of poor patients at these 10 hospitals ranges from
15.68% to 21.55%. The overall weighted readmission rate for the 10 hospitals in the fifth
quintile is 20.19%. Among the 10 hospitals, one (Teaching Hospital 5) has an excess
readmission rate and this one hospital is a teaching hospital.
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Figure 5.6: Forest Plot for Quintile 5 (hospitals with the highest proportion of poor
patients) Hospital Readmission Rates and 95% Confidence Intervals

*

Note: Quintile 5 represents hospitals with the highest proportion of poor patients
(Indigent and Medicaid) in South Carolina. The proportion of low income patients in the
fifth quintile ranged from 15.68% to 21.55%. Each horizontal line represents the
readmission rate (black box) and 95% confidence interval of each hospital as indicated by
the vertical axis. The vertical red line represents the fifth quintile weighted average
readmission rate of 20.19%. Penalized hospitals are represented by hospitals whose entire
95% confidence interval is to the right of the red line. *Denotes hospitals deemed to have
excessive readmission rates based on the quintile approach.
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The preceding descriptive analysis provides a procedure for determining when a
hospital has an excess readmission rate that allows the administrative agency to control
for exogenous patient mix characteristics that influence patient remittance. These patient
characteristics are independent of overall hospital care quality but influence hospital
readmission rates. Although this approach does not directly risk adjust for
socioeconomic status, hospitals are grouped by the proportion of poor patients served
thereby providing a means of addressing differences in patient mix among hospitals.
Comparing the readmission rate of a hospital in each quintile group to their quintile
average partially removes the impact of patient mix on readmission status while
maintaining a standard of patient care.
Figure 5.1 through Figure 5.6 provide a visual means to identify hospitals that
have excess readmission and therefore would be penalized (i.e., hospitals with the entire
95% confidence interval to the right of the vertical average quintile rate line) as well as
hospitals that would not be penalized (i.e., hospitals with 95% confidence intervals that
cross the vertical average line or are to the left of the vertical line). However, these
graphics do not provide a clear measure of the degree to which each hospital will be
penalized. Penalties for excess readmissions result in a percentage reduction in Medicare
reimbursements. CMS currently uses a proprietary algorithm, which translates the degree
to which a hospital's excess readmission rate is above the national rate into a downward
payment adjustment. The maximum downward adjustment factor is 3%. In this analysis,
excess readmissions penalties are calculated as the distance between a hospitals average
readmission rate and the state-wide (or quintile based) average readmission rate. Using
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this methodology, excess readmission penalties are estimated for the current penalty
structure (state-wide) and compared to the proposed penalty structure (quintile based).
The estimated penalty calculation in this analysis is the difference between hospital
readmission rate and comparative in-state quintile level average readmission rate. This
procedure is not representative of the traditional Medicare reduction penalty used by
CMS, which is a function of the overall average (not quintile average) rate. The crude
penalty calculation used for this analysis is the average excess readmission rate in
percentage terms for all hospitals having excess readmission in a given quintile. For
example, if 3 hospitals in a quintile have excess readmission rates, and the distances
between their readmission rates and the quintile reference rate are 1%, 2%, and 3%,
respectively. The average readmission penalty for the three hospitals is 2%. In the
following analysis the percent penalty reduction is assumed to be equal to the average
excess readmission rate.
The estimated penalty amounts are presented in Table 5.5 for all hospitals,
teaching hospitals, and non-teaching hospitals using both the state-wide average and
quintile-level average comparisons. Using the state-wide comparison approach, a total of
7 hospitals were penalized at an average estimated rate of 5.81%. Four teaching hospitals
had an excess readmission rate of 4.61%, and three non-teaching hospitals had an average
excess readmission rate of 7.41%. In contrast, the quintile-level comparison revealed 8
hospitals would face penalty based on their average excess readmission rate of 4.69%.
Furthermore, the quintile level comparison produced 4 teaching hospitals with an
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average penalty of 3.78%, based on an excess average readmission rate of 3.78%, and 4
non-teaching hospitals had an average penalty of 5.61%.
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Table 5.5: Mean reimbursement penalty as a percentage decrease of full reimbursement under existing average
approach versus quintile level approach
Percent Change
Existing Penalty Calculation
Quintile Penalty Calculation
in Penalty
Estimated
No. Hospitals
Estimated
No. Hospitals Using Quintile
Penalty*
Penalized
Penalty*
Penalized
Approach
All Hospitals
5.81 ± 1.86
7
4.69 ± 2.40
8
-19.3
Teaching Hospitals
4.61 ± 0.55
4
3.78 ± 0.77
4
-18.0
Non-Teaching Hospitals
7.41 ± 1.79
3
5.61 ± 3.29
4
-24.3
*Estimated penalties are represented as mean ± standard deviation difference between hospital average and reference
group average (state-wide or quintile)
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The most important empirical result is the overall penalty is 19.3% less (4.69%
versus 5.81%), with quintile averages than the state-wide average. It is hypothesized that
this reduction in penalty is correlated to the populations of poor (indigent and Medicaid)
which are now, to at least some degree, controlled for through the quintile-level analysis.
While not directly adjusting for socioeconomic status, the quintile-level approach
represents a method that indirectly controls for the percentage of poor patients who have
been shown to disproportionally be readmitted.
Another finding likely a function of the South Carolina data and hence not
representative of the nation as based on the literature, (Joynt and Jha 2013, Shimizu 2014,
Muller 2013, Shahian 2012) is the estimated penalty reduction for non-teaching hospitals
(24.3%) is greater than for teaching hospitals (18.0%). That is, relative to the national
average approach, the quintile level approach provides greater penalty relief to nonteaching hospitals than teaching hospitals in South Carolina. Despite this unexpected
outcome, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that grouping hospitals into
income quintiles based on the proportion of poor patients they serve would marginally
reduce the reimbursement penalty. It is important to note that these are aggregate
measures and not direct comparisons of the two penalty estimates at the same hospital.
That analysis is conducted later in this chapter.
The important finding is that non-teaching hospitals have larger penalties than the
non-profit teaching hospitals that arguably cannot turn patients away. It is uncertain if
this result is an anomaly of the South Carolina dataset. Further analysis incorporating
national level data would be needed to resolve that issue. One possible explanation of
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this anomaly might be that teaching hospitals are better equipped to handle the sickest of
the sick which could offset the effect of the difference in share of low income patients
between non-profit teaching hospitals and for-profit non-teaching hospitals.
The results presented in Table 5.5 are based on the assumption that the average
state-wide mean readmission rate and each quintile mean readmission rate are equal to
the true but unknown respective population readmission rates. However, the loss of
independence created by calculating each hospital's readmission rate and aggregating
those data for the 48 hospitals' to determine the comparative statewide and quintile level
readmission rates must be controlled for. The loss of independence here is that the
weighted average state-wide readmission rate is comprised of each of the 48 hospital's
data, to which the individual hospitals are compared for penalty determination. Thereby
making the aggregate state-wide average dependent upon each hospital's readmission
data. To address this issue, a series of 1,000 bootstrapped readmission rates were sampled
with replacement for each of the 48 hospitals. Aggregating each resampled readmission
rate for all 48 hospitals resulted in 1,000 state-wide readmission rates for comparison.
The bootstrapping process allows for the analysis of how often each hospital is
determined to have excess readmission rates as a proportion of the 1,000 tested samples.
Recalling from the empirical analysis, a hospital is deemed to have excess readmissions if
the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval is entirely above the state-wide rate, or
quintile level rate. The bootstrapping process allows for analysis of the 48,000
bootstrapped hospital samples to be compared to 1,000 state-wide averages, as well as
5,000 quintile group averages (1,000 for each quintile) as a means of evaluating the
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empirical analysis. The computer code for the bootstrap analysis is provided in Appendix
D.
Table 5.6 presents the bootstrapping results in a similar manor to Table 5.5.
Similar trends emerge from the bootstrapped analysis. For all hospitals, the excess
readmission penalty is less under the quintile approach than the state-wide average
approach (5.83% versus 6.17%). However, the percentage reduction is only 5.51% less
using the bootstrap approach versus the 19.3% reduction in the non bootstrap estimation.
The discrepancy noted between the two empirical approaches is likely due to the impact
of using aggregate hospital data to determine the state-wide average readmission rate,
then comparing the individual hospital's readmission rate to that state-wide average. The
bootstrap analysis also revealed similar reductions in the readmission penalty for both
teaching and non-teaching hospitals. Non-profit teaching hospitals have a 7.66%
reduction in penalty amount, and the percent reduction for the for non-teaching hospitals
is 8.83%. The bootstrapped results confirm the readmission penalty decreases across all
hospitals when the quintile average is used as the reference measure. However, these
average results do not reveal the full difference in penalty amounts between the two
methods for each individual hospital.
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Table 5.6: Mean reimbursement penalty as a percentage decrease of full reimbursement under existing average approach
versus quintile approach based on 1,000 bootstrapped samples.
Existing Penalty Calculation
Quintile Penalty Calculation
Percent Change in
Penalty Using
Estimated
No. Hospitals
Estimated
No. Hospitals
Quintile
Approach
Penalty*
Penalized **
Penalty*
Penalized **
All Hospitals
6.17 ± 2.43
18
5.83 ± 2.40
19
-5.51
Teaching Hospitals
4.83 ± 1.49
6
4.46 ± 1.40
7
-7.66
Non-Teaching Hospitals
7.93 ± 2.32
12
7.23 ± 3.02
12
-8.83
*Estimated penalties are represented as mean ± standard deviation difference between hospital average and reference
group average (state-wide or quintile)
** If any of the 1,000 samples resulted in a penalty for a particular hospital

88

To further analyze the difference between the two methods, the difference in same
hospital penalties were calculated. As before, the amount of penalty is proxied by the
difference between a hospital's readmission rate and the state-wide (or quintile-level)
comparison, only for hospitals deemed to have excess readmissions. Direct comparison
of the difference in penalty value for the same hospital provides a more useful metric for
assessing the difference in penalty structures. If a hospital was not penalized under the
original method but is subsequently penalized using the quintile-level comparison, the
difference is the entirety of the new penalty. Conversely, if a hospital is penalized using
the state-wide comparison and is not penalized using the quintile-level comparison, the
difference is the negative amount of the original penalty.
Table 5.7 Difference in Amount of Penalty For State-Wide and
Quintile-Level Comparisons
Same Hospital Penalty Difference*
Empirical Data
Bootstrapped Data
All Hospitals
-0.38
-0.69
Teaching Hospitals
-0.83
-1.12
Non-Teaching Hospitals
0.05
-0.22
*Amounts are represented as averages for respective groups, where
Penalty difference = (Quintile-level penalty) - (State-Wide penalty)
Table 5.7 reports the difference in penalty amount between the state-wide and
quintile-level comparisons. For each hospital, both methods of calculating excess
readmissions penalties were performed, then the difference between the quintile level
method and state-wide method was calculated. The resulting differences are presented in
Table 5.7 where negative values indicate the quintile-level method resulted in lower
penalties than the state-wide method, conceivably representing the differences in
exogenous socioeconomic characteristics. This approach reduces noise created among
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hospitals with very large or very small penalties by analyzing both methods of estimating
excess readmission penalties for the same hospital. Comparing the estimated penalties
from the state-wide and quintile level methods is a useful metric to show differences at
the same hospital. Similar trends are seen in both Table 5.6 and Table 5.7, where
hospitals are penalized less under the quintile-level method relative to the state-wide
method. Furthermore, a larger reduction is seen for teaching hospitals than non-teaching
hospitals (1.12% versus 0.22%); a result empirically estimated and then confirmed
through the bootstrapped analysis.
In conclusion, analyzing excess readmissions relative to other hospitals with
similar patient mix lessens the estimation bias caused by heterogeneous patient mixes in
the current method used to calculate excess readmissions. Calculating excess
readmissions rates and penalties using a similar method to the one proposed by
MEDPAC will not necessarily reduced the overall number of hospitals facing penalties.
Instead it helps to focus the problem of readmissions back to the quality issues the HRRP
is designed to address.
Although the absolute reduction in excess readmissions penalties is not large, the
percent reductions reveal the importance of considering patient socioeconomic
characteristics when calculating excess readmission penalties. These results do not
directly imply that reductions in readmission rate penalties resulting from a MEDPAC
type penalty structure will reduce cost shifting. However, an overall reduction in excess
readmissions for all hospitals will reduce financial penalties, which arguably could
reduce the incentive hospitals have to shift cost. Furthermore, these results highlight the
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importance of "family" in the medical care market, as well as the importance of the
prestige maximizing "charitable" member of the family, which are the nonprofit teaching
hospitals. The "family" for medical care stands to benefit from a reduction in excess
readmission rate penalties when socioeconomic factors are included in the penalty
calculation.
It is important to note that the estimated penalty reductions in this study are
proxies for the true penalty algorithm used by CMS. Another important consideration is
that while the percentage improvement may seem small, once multiplied by the
multimillion dollar Medicare reimbursements, their magnitude will reveal significant
improvements in revenue streams among nonprofit teaching hospitals and the medical
care market as a whole.
Using an appropriate national data set including financial data tied to
hospitalizations, the excess readmissions penalty associated with a poorer patient mix can
more fairly be calculated. Comparing these penalties under the current method (national
comparison) and the new method (quintile/decile comparison) might reveal a reduction in
the amount of penalty paid when compared to a cohort of hospitals with similar patient
mix. The reduction in penalty could thereby reduce the potential need to shift cost to
private insurers.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
I. Introduction
Numerous studies have found that lower socioeconomic status contributes to the
likelihood of readmission due to patients having less access to care, non-compliance to
physician orders, and lower nutritional status, among many other reasons (Mueller et al.
2013, and Shahian et al. 2012, Philbin et al 2001, Shimizu et al. 2014). Joynt, Jha (2013)
suggest that these differences are due in large part to patient socioeconomic factors and
the greater proportion of medically complex cases larger teaching hospitals encounter
relative to smaller non-teaching hospitals. Joynt and Jha also found that the level of
Medicare reimbursement penalties is correlated with socioeconomic status. This prior
research support the hypothesis that socioeconomic status tends to be negatively
correlated with increased medical complexity. Moreover, low income patients tend to be
admitted and readmitted to nonprofit teaching and safety net hospitals in a higher
proportion of all admissions relative to other hospital types (Philbin et al., 2001).
This evidence, coupled with unique differences in optimization decisions between
for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, sets the foundation to study excess readmissions
penalties among two hospital types. For-profit hospitals can be expected to maximize
profits as a function of increasing patient quantities. Nonprofit hospitals, however, are
hypothesized to optimize prestige through maximizing revenues constrained by covering
costs under a fixed operating margin subject to a unique mix of patients (Hirth, 1997;
Horwtiz 2015; Rosenman et al., 2000). The incorporation of a nonprofit hospital's
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exogenously determined patient mix into optimization decisions requires these hospitals
to offset potential losses from uncompensated care provided to poor and indigent patients
by shifting costs to privately insured patients (Hadley and Feder, 1986; Dranove, 1988).
A reinterpretation of Becker's 1974 essay "A Theory of Social Interactions" further
supports the role of nonprofit hospitals in the market for medical care by positing that
they can be viewed as acting as "charitable" family members. Nonprofit hospitals as
"charitable" family members seek to maximize prestige through redistributing increased
revenue from the privately insured to cover the cost of uncompensated care to poor and
uninsured patients.
The unique nature of medical care markets, differences in hospital type and
optimization decisions, and the knowledge that poor patients are readmitted in higher
proportions to nonprofit teaching hospitals, prompted a review of the Hospital
Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP). The current method of assessing excess
readmissions penalties used by The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
does not account for differences in patient mix. Evidence provided here supports the
notion that socioeconomic factors and unique patient mix among the distribution of forprofit and nonprofit hospitals does impact readmission rates and resulting excess
readmissions penalties.
The objectives of this research were to demonstrate the differences among
hospital readmission rates and resulting penalties by hospital type and socioeconomic
factors to demonstrate how the current Hospital Readmission Reduction program
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disproportionately penalizes nonprofit teaching hospitals for excess readmissions as a
result of their exogenous patient mix.
II. Conclusions
To satisfy the research objective, a longitudinal data set of South Carolina
inpatient hospital visits from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2011 was used to
document differences between for-profit hospitals and nonprofit teaching hospitals. The
data were used to demonstrate the differences between the current method of calculating
excess readmission rates and the new method proposed by the Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission (MEDPAC, 2013) that groups hospitals based on the proportion of
poor patients they serve.
Differences in patient mix between South Carolina for-profit and nonprofit
teaching hospitals proxied by the percentage of Medicaid and indigent patients cared for
by each hospital type were documented in Chapter IV. Non-profits were shown to have a
greater percentage of indigent and Medicaid patients. This finding supports the growing
body of literature that argues the unique mix of patients between hospital types requires
different optimization decisions between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. Moreover,
comparing excess readmission penalties under the current program (CMS, HRRP) and
the method proposed by MEDPAC suggests that incorporating patient mix into the excess
readmission penalty will reduce readmission penalties and increase hospital revenue.
Moreover, a reduction in excess readmission penalties would theoretically reduce the
incentive to shift costs from those unable to pay to patients with the ability to pay. A
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secondary benefit of the proposed excess readmission penalty calculation is that it will
more fairly assess the quality of hospital care.
As reported in Chapter V, both empirically and through the bootstrap simulations,
adjusting a hospital's readmission rate to control for the proportion of poor patients
reduces the level of excess readmission penalty. Furthermore, the socioeconomic
adjustment benefits nonprofit teaching hospitals to a greater degree. The same hospital
penalty reduction was 1.12% for nonprofit teaching hospitals and 0.22% for for profit
non-teaching hospitals in the bootstrap analysis. The resulting difference between
nonprofit and for-profit penalties provide support to the hypothesis that nonprofit
hospitals serve as "charitable" members of the healthcare family by caring for the poorest
members of society who are often the sickest.

III. Discussion
While these results are limited by a lack of more detailed data on patient
characteristics, they provide support that socioeconomic status is an integral aspect of
determining excess hospital readmissions. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS), and the Yale New Haven Health Services Corporation (YNHHSC)
make strong cases for not including socioeconomic status as a risk-adjustment factor
when determining readmissions rates. These groups argue it is inappropriate to adjust for
patient characteristics because all patients deserve the same quality of care regardless of
socioeconomic status. While it is necessary and important to maintain quality standards
in the medical care market, arguably, it is equally as important to note the differences in
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patient characteristics and patient mix between hospital types impact the excess
readmission rate.
Current literature provides support for these findings, and the importance of
modifying the excess readmission penalty to control for hospital patient mix. Barnett et
al. (2015) used Health and Retirement Study surveys with linked Medicare claims from
2009 to 2012 and identified 29 patient characteristics outside of the standard risk
adjustments used by Medicare to assess the extent to which these additional patient
variables impact readmission rates. Of the 29 characteristics identified, 22 predicted
readmission (Barnett 2015). Thus, there is a growing body of research that suggests
patient specific factors contribute to the likelihood of readmission that are not currently
incorporated into excess readmission calculations by CMS. Barnett et al. conclude
"Hospitals with high readmission rates may be penalized to a large
extent based on the patients they serve (page E1)."
The results of Barnett et al. suggest that hospital readmission is less likely to be explained
by the quality of care provided to a patient, and more likely to be explained by the
attributes of the patient. Fundamentals of medical care and the structure of the United
States Healthcare system does not allow for most hospitals to control the patient
populations they serve. Yet hospitals continue to be penalized for readmissions
exogenous factors largely outside their control.
Recently, Zuckerman et al. addressed the issue of maintaining quality care in the
presence of excess readmissions penalties (2016). They discuss the claim that some
hospitals may circumvent possible readmission penalties by placing patients who return
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to the hospital within 30-days of a previous admission in "observational units" rather than
readmitting the patient. The claim posits that some hospitals may use administrative and
coding techniques to avoid penalties of having the patient readmitted. They analyzed
3,387 hospitals between 2007 and 2015 and found that changes in observational-unit
stays did not account for decreases in readmissions (Zuckerman et al., 2016). This finding
suggests that even though hospitals may attempt to to inappropriately circumvent
penalties, such actions have not been successful at the individual hospital level.
Sheingold et al. (2016) address the issue of differences in readmissions penalties
between nonprofit safety-net hospitals and other hospitals. They found that patient
socioeconomic factors partly explain readmission rate differences, and safety-net
hospitals have slightly higher readmission rates than other hospital types. The authors
further conclude that their findings, among others currently in the literature, support the
need for consideration of policy alternatives for excess readmission rate and penalty
calculations (Sheingold et al., 2016).
The debate and discussion of policy changes to the Hospital Readmission
Reduction program is continuously evolving. The current findings of Barnett et al.,
Zuckerman et al., and Sheingold et al., provide evidence and support that excess
readmission penalty determination needs to incorporate patient level factors and hospital
type considerations. The importance of these findings may result in policies that more
accurately identify underperforming hospitals after controlling for patient mix.
Furthermore, the resulting policy changes stand to improve the entire healthcare "family"
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by incorporating measures that highlight the need for the "charitable" nonprofit hospital
in conjunction with for-profit hospitals to best treat populations in need of medical care.

IV. Study Limitations
The Hospital Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP) is a program directly
attributed to the Medicare population. However, the data used contain a sample of South
Carolina inpatient hospitalizations reported for patients of all ages, not just Medicare
patients. While the data used contained some Medicare patients, it does not contain all
inpatient hospitalizations for Medicare patients in the state. Therefore, the entire data set
of all adult hospital claims was used because selecting only the Medicare population
would have resulted in an insufficiently small dataset given the HRRP
inclusion/exclusion criteria. Additionally, the collected dataset only included patients
with index admissions for acute heart attacks (AMI), heart failure and pneumonia.
Therefore, determination of the proportion of poor patients at each hospital and the
resulting quintiles used for analysis is incomplete. To more accurately conduct this study
all hospital admissions for any patient in the state during the study period are needed.
Furthermore, HRRP analyzes excess readmission rates using a rolling three-year
average. Due to insufficient data to satisfy the requirements of The Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid guidelines for calculating readmissions, a 5 year data series was used.
Another limitation is the lack of risk adjusting, due to inadequate risk adjustment
variables. A statewide database provides a unique and interesting perspective for
conducting a study of excess readmissions calculations. However, a nationally
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representative, risk adjusted database of Medicare patients would best be able to
determine the impact of proposed policy changes. The study is also limited due to the
small sample size of teaching and non-teaching hospitals. Comparing 8 teaching
hospitals to 40 non-teaching hospitals makes the results less robust than a national study.
A comprehensive dataset that aggregated all United States teaching and non-teaching
hospitals would provide the best data for this analysis.
Additional limitations include the inability to quantify the degree of nonprofit
hospital prestige maximization. The notion of prestige maximization is discussed in the
literature, but consensus on how to best quantify the theoretically ambiguous concept of
prestige has never been reached. With appropriate data, profit maximization among forprofit hospitals could be determined. Further research is required to understand the
interactions and optimization of nonprofit prestige maximizing hospitals and profit
maximizing hospitals within the medical care "family".
The results presented here, in conjunction with current and future research
provide some evidence for the need to improve the calculation of the excess readmission
rate and penalty determinations through policy changes that incorporate patient level
factors and hospital type. Changes to the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program as a
result of this continued research stands to more fairly penalize hospitals while
maintaining high quality standards of care.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
R Code for Variable Creation
#Index
AMImr<-read.csv("AMImr.csv",sep=",", header=TRUE)
AMImr$ADMD=as.Date(AMImr$ADMD,"%m/%d/%Y" )
AMImr$DISD=as.Date(AMImr$DISD,"%m/%d/%Y" )
AMISORT<-AMImr[order(AMImr$ID, AMImr$ADMD, AMImr$ADHOUR),]
N = nrow(AMISORT)
#AMISORT$RA = rep(NA, N)
AMISORT$Index = rep(NA, N)
#AMISORT$Transfer= rep(NA, N)
for(i in 2:N){
if(AMISORT$AMI[i]==1 ){
AMISORT$Index[i] = 1
}
else if (AMISORT$ID[i] == AMISORT$ID[i-1] &&
AMISORT$ADMD[i]==AMISORT$ADMD[i-1] ){
AMISORT$Index[i] = 0
}
else {
AMISORT$Index[i] = 0
}
}
write.csv(AMISORT, file="AMImrI.csv")

#Transfer
AMImrI<-read.csv("AMImrI.csv",sep=",", header=TRUE)
AMImrI$ADMD=as.Date(AMImrI$ADMD,"%m/%d/%Y" )
AMImrI$DISD=as.Date(AMImrI$DISD,"%m/%d/%Y" )
AMISORT<-AMImrI[order(AMImrI$ID, AMImrI$ADMD, AMImrI$ADHOUR),]
N = nrow(AMISORT)
#AMISORT$RA = rep(NA, N)
#AMISORT$Index = rep(NA, N)
AMISORT$Transfer= rep(NA, N)
for(i in 3:N){
if(AMISORT$ID[i] == AMISORT$ID[i-1] && AMISORT$ADMD[i] AMISORT$DISD[i-1]<=1 && AMISORT$Index[i-1]==1 && AMISORT$HID[i]
!=AMISORT$HID[i-1]){
AMISORT$Transfer[i] = 1
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}
else if (AMISORT$ID[i] == AMISORT$ID[i-1] && AMISORT$ADMD[i] AMISORT$DISD[i-2]<=1 && AMISORT$Index[i-2]==1 && AMISORT$HID[i]
!=AMISORT$HID[i-1]){
AMISORT$Transfer[i] = 1
}
else {
AMISORT$Transfer[i] = 0
}
}
write.csv(AMISORT, file="AMImrIT.csv", row.names=FALSE)

#RAi- Index readmission
AMImrIT<-read.csv("AMImrIT.csv",sep=",", header=TRUE)
AMImrIT$ADMD=as.Date(AMImrIT$ADMD,"%m/%d/%Y" )
AMImrIT$DISD=as.Date(AMImrIT$DISD,"%m/%d/%Y" )
AMISORT<-AMImrIT[order(AMImrIT$ID, AMImrIT$ADMD, AMImrIT$ADHOUR),]
N = nrow(AMISORT)
AMISORT$RAi = rep(NA, N)
#AMISORT$RAr = rep(NA, N)
#AMISORT$Index = rep(NA, N)
#AMISORT$Transfer= rep(NA, N)
for(i in 3:N){
if(AMISORT$ID[i] == AMISORT$ID[i-1] && AMISORT$AMI[i-1]==1 &&
AMISORT$Transfer[i]!=1){
AMISORT$RAi[i-1] = 1
}
else if(AMISORT$ID[i] == AMISORT$ID[i-2] && AMISORT$AMI[i-2]==1 ){
AMISORT$RAi[i-2] = 1
}
else {
AMISORT$RAi[i] = 0
}
}
write.csv(AMISORT, file="AMImrITRi.csv", row.names=FALSE)
#RAi30
AMImrTIRir<-read.csv("AMImrTIRir.csv",sep=",", header=TRUE)
AMImrTIRir$ADMD=as.Date(AMImrTIRir$ADMD,"%m/%d/%Y" )
AMImrTIRir$DISD=as.Date(AMImrTIRir$DISD,"%m/%d/%Y" )
AMISORT<-AMImrTIRir[order(AMImrTIRir$ID, AMImrTIRir$ADMD,
AMImrTIRir$ADHOUR),]
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N = nrow(AMISORT)
AMISORT$RAi30 = rep(NA, N)
#AMISORT$RAr = rep(NA, N)
#AMISORT$Index = rep(NA, N)
#AMISORT$Transfer= rep(NA, N)
for(i in 3:N){
if(AMISORT$ADMD[i] - AMISORT$DISD[i-1]<= 30 && AMISORT$ID[i] ==
AMISORT$ID[i-1] && AMISORT$Index[i-1]==1 && AMISORT$Transfer[i]!=1){
AMISORT$RAi30[i-1] = 1
}
else if(AMISORT$ADMD[i]-AMISORT$DISD[i-2]<=30 && AMISORT$ID[i] ==
AMISORT$ID[i-2] && AMISORT$Index[i-2]==1 && AMISORT$RAi[i-1]!= 1){
AMISORT$RAi30[i-2] = 1
}
else {
AMISORT$RAi30[i] = NA
}
}
write.csv(AMISORT, file="AMImrITRi30.csv", row.names=FALSE)
#RAi30t
AMImrTIRir3030<-read.csv("AMImrTIRir3030.csv",sep=",", header=TRUE)
AMImrTIRir3030$ADMD=as.Date(AMImrTIRir3030$ADMD,"%m/%d/%Y" )
AMImrTIRir3030$DISD=as.Date(AMImrTIRir3030$DISD,"%m/%d/%Y" )
AMISORT<-AMImrTIRir3030[order(AMImrTIRir3030$ID, AMImrTIRir3030$ADMD,
AMImrTIRir3030$ADHOUR),]
N = nrow(AMISORT)
AMISORT$RAi30t = rep(NA, N)
#AMISORT$RAr = rep(NA, N)
#AMISORT$Index = rep(NA, N)
#AMISORT$Transfer= rep(NA, N)
for(i in 3:N){
if(AMISORT$ADMD[i] - AMISORT$DISD[i-1]<= 30 && AMISORT$ID[i] ==
AMISORT$ID[i-1] && AMISORT$Index[i-1]==1 && AMISORT$Transfer[i]!=1){
AMISORT$RAi30t[i-1] = (AMISORT$ADMD[i] - AMISORT$DISD[i-1])
}
else if(AMISORT$ADMD[i]-AMISORT$DISD[i-2]<=30 && AMISORT$ID[i] ==
AMISORT$ID[i-2] && AMISORT$Index[i-2]==1 && AMISORT$RAi[i-1]!= 1){
AMISORT$RAi30t[i-2] = (AMISORT$ADMD[i] - AMISORT$DISD[i-2])
}
else {
AMISORT$RAi30t[i] = NA
}
}
write.csv(AMISORT, file="AMImrITRi3030t.csv", row.names=FALSE)
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Appendix B
R-Code for Hospital Exclusion
AMI<-read.csv("AMImrITRi3030t.csv",sep=",", header=TRUE)
AMI$ADMD=as.Date(AMI$ADMD,"%m/%d/%Y")
AMI$DISD=as.Date(AMI$DISD,"%m/%d/%Y")
AMIsort<-AMI[order(AMI$ID, AMI$DISD),]
AMI07<-AMIsort[which(AMIsort$DISD<'2008-01-01'),]
AMI08<-AMIsort[which(AMIsort$DISD>'2007-12-31' & AMIsort$DISD<'2009-0101'),]
AMI09<-AMIsort[which(AMIsort$DISD>'2008-12-31' & AMIsort$DISD<'2010-0101'),]
AMI10<-AMIsort[which(AMIsort$DISD>'2009-12-31' & AMIsort$DISD<'2011-0101'),]
AMI11<-AMIsort[which(AMIsort$DISD>='2011-01-01'),]
table(AMI07$Index, AMI07$HID)
AMI$AMI07q<-0
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==50)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==105)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==155)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==220)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==280)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==310)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==340)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==347)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==390)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==420)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==430)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==450)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==460)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==490)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==540)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==565)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==570)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==575)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==580)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==590)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==610)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==630)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==640)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==645)]=1
AMI$AMI07q[which(AMI$HID==650)]=1
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table(AMI08$Index, AMI08$HID)
AMI$AMI08q<-0
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==50)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==105)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==155)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==220)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==280)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==310)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==340)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==347)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==390)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==420)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==430)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==450)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==460)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==490)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==540)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==565)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==570)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==575)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==580)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==590)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==610)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==630)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==640)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==645)]=1
AMI$AMI08q[which(AMI$HID==650)]=1
table(AMI09$Index, AMI09$HID)
AMI$AMI09q<-0
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==50)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==105)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==120)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==155)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==220)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==280)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==340)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==345)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==347)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==420)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==430)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==450)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==460)]=1
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AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==490)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==540)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==565)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==570)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==575)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==580)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==590)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==600)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==610)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==630)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==640)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==645)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==650)]=1
AMI$AMI09q[which(AMI$HID==651)]=1
table(AMI10$Index, AMI10$HID)
AMI$AMI10q<-0
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==50)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==105)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==155)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==220)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==280)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==310)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==340)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==345)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==347)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==420)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==430)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==450)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==460)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==490)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==540)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==565)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==570)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==575)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==580)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==590)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==610)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==630)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==640)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==645)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==650)]=1
AMI$AMI10q[which(AMI$HID==668)]=1
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table(AMI11$Index, AMI11$HID)
AMI$AMI11q<-0
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==50)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==105)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==120)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==140)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==155)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==220)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==280)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==310)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==340)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==345)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==347)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==370)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==390)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==420)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==430)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==450)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==460)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==490)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==540)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==565)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==570)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==575)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==580)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==590)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==600)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==610)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==630)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==640)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==645)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==650)]=1
AMI$AMI11q[which(AMI$HID==668)]=1
write.csv(AMI, file="AMIq.csv", row.names=FALSE)
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Appendix C
Data Variables and Descriptions
Variable Name
(for non-ASC11)
ADHOUR

Data
Element
Admission Hour

Type
Num

Length
3

Values
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
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12:00 - 12:59 Midnight
01:00 - 01:59 AM
02:00 - 02:59 AM
03:00 - 03:59 AM
04:00 - 04:59 AM
05:00 - 05:59 AM
06:00 - 06:59 AM
07:00 - 07:59 AM
08:00 - 08:59 AM
09:00 - 09:59 AM
10:00 - 10:59 AM
11:00 - 11:59 AM
12:00 - 12:59 Noon
01:00 - 01:59 PM
02:00 - 02:59 PM
03:00 - 03:59 PM
04:00 - 04:59 PM
05:00 - 05:59 PM
06:00 - 06:59 PM
07:00 - 07:59 PM
08:00 - 08:59 PM
09:00 - 09:59 PM
10:00 - 10:59 PM

Comments
The hour is in
military format.
For Quarter 4 2006
data, the ADHOUR
variable is missing
from approximately
3% of the records.

Variable Name
(for non-ASC11)

Data
Element

Type

Length

ADMD

Admission Date

Num

8

ADMDAY

Admission Day of
the week

Num

8

ADMMTH

Admission Month
of the Year
Admission Source

Num

8

Char

1

ADMS

Values

Comments

23 11:00 - 11:59 PM
99 Hour Unknown
SAS Date

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
A
B
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For observation
cases, the date the
patient is actually
admitted is the
admission date.

Sunday
Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
Friday
Saturday

Physician Referral
Clinic Referral
HMO Referral
Transfer from Hospital
Transfer from Skilled Nursing
Facility
Transfer from Another Health
Care Facility
Emergency Room
Court/Law Enforcement
Info Not Available
Transfer from Critical Access
Hospital
Transfer from a HHA

If determining a
person admitted
through the ED, use
CHG450 greater than
zero.
When ADM_TYPE
equals ‘4’, use the
Newborn Coding
Structure.

Variable Name
(for non-ASC11)

Data
Element

Type

Length

Values
C
D
E
F

Comments
Readmit to same HHA
Transfer from Hospital Inpatient
in the Same Facility
Transfer from Ambulatory
Surgery Center
Transfer from a hospice facility

Newborn Coding Structure:
1
Normal Delivery
2
Premature Delivery
3
Sick Baby
4
Extramural Birth
5
Born in this Hospital
6
Born outside this Hospital
ADMYEAR
ADM_DIAG

Num
Char

8
6

ADM_TYPE

Admission Year
Admission
Diagnosis
Admission Type

Char

1

AGE

Patient Age

Num

5

AGRP

Patient Age Group

Num

3

ICD-9
1
2
3
4
5
6– 8
9
Integer

Emergency
Urgent
Elective
Newborn
Trauma Center Activation
Reserved National Assignment
N/A

1
2
3

Age less than 1
Age 01-04
Age 05-09
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Age at date of
discharge.
Patient Age Group

Variable Name
(for non-ASC11)

Data
Element

Type

Length

DISD
DISDAY

Discharge Date
Discharge Day of
the week

Num
Num

8
8

DISDHR

Discharge Hour

Num

3

Values
4
Age 10-14
5
Age 15-19
6
Age 20-24
7
Age 25-29
8
Age 30-34
9
Age 35-39
10
Age 40-44
11
Age 45-49
12
Age 50-54
13
Age 55-59
14
Age 60-64
15
Age 65-69
16
Age 70-74
17
Age 75-79
18
Age 80-84
19
Age 85+
SAS Date
1 Sunday
2 Monday
3 Tuesday
4 Wednesday
5 Thursday
6 Friday
7 Saturday
00 12:00 - 12:59 Midnight
01 01:00 - 01:59 AM
02 02:00 - 02:59 AM
03 03:00 - 03:59 AM
04 04:00 - 04:59 AM
05 05:00 - 05:59 AM
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Comments

The hour is in
military format.

Variable Name
(for non-ASC11)

Data
Element

Type

Length

Values
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
99

DISMTH
DISYEAR
DISP
DOB
DRG4

06:00 - 06:59 AM
07:00 - 07:59 AM
08:00 - 08:59 AM
09:00 - 09:59 AM
10:00 - 10:59 AM
11:00 - 11:59 AM
12:00 - 12:59 Noon
01:00 - 01:59 PM
02:00 - 02:59 PM
03:00 - 03:59 PM
04:00 - 04:59 PM
05:00 - 05:59 PM
06:00 - 06:59 PM
07:00 - 07:59 PM
08:00 - 08:59 PM
09:00 - 09:59 PM
10:00 - 10:59 PM
11:00 - 11:59 PM
Hour Unknown

Discharge Month
of the Year
Discharge Year
Discharge Status

Num

8

Num
Num

8
3

Appendix P

Patient Date Of
Birth
Diagnosis Related
Group

Num

8

SAS Date

Num

4

CMS-DRG Version 24
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Comments

100% of Inpatient
Records are coded.

Variable Name
(for non-ASC11)
ER

Data
Element
Emergency Room
Flag
Hospital ID
Ors Assigned
Tracking #
Bed Size based on
Licensed Beds

Type

Length

Values

Comments

Num

3

.=Inpatient

Num
Num

5
8

Appendix A: Hospital ID Table
Encrypted Individual Tracking #

Char

1

Length Of Stay
Major Diagnostic
Category
Medical Record
Number
MS-DRG
Outpatient
Surgery Flag

Num
Num

5
8

1
< 100
2
101-299
3
300+
Integer
Valid Code Range: 1 – 25. Appendix I:
Major Diagnostic Categories.

Char

17

Num
Num

8
3

PAT_NO

Patient Number

Char

20

PAYOR1
PCODE

Primary Payor
Surgery coding
methodology
Primary Day of
Surgery
Primary Diagnosis

Num
Num

3
8

Num

1

Char

6

Cause Of Injury
Code

Char

6

HID
ID
LBEDGRP

LOSD1
MDC
MED_NO
MSDRG
OP

PDATE
PDIAG
PECODE

1=Emergency Room Visit

Number of Days

Starts October 2007 w/ Version 25
Only when imaging
and outpatient
surgery are in same
file.
Facility-assigned
patient identifier
Appendix L: Payor Code Table
1=ICD-9, 2=ICD-10
In relation to
admission date
001 – 999 ; V01 – V829
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
E800 – E869 and E877 – E999
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual,
Supplementary Classification of Injury
and Poisoning.
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An E-code is required
when the primary
diagnosis is an injury
(Dx 800 – 959).

Variable Name
(for non-ASC11)
PPOA

Data
Element
Primary Present
on Admission

PPROC

PPROCD

Type

Length

Values

Comments

Char

1

Primary Procedure

Char

7

Primary Procedure
Date
Patient Race

Num

8

SAS date

Num

3

.
1
2
3
4
5
6

SDATE1SDATE12
SDIAG1

Secondary Day of
Surgery
1st Secondary
Diagnosis

Num

3

Char

6

SDIAG2

2nd Secondary
Diagnosis
3rd Secondary
Diagnosis
4th Secondary
Diagnosis
5th Secondary
Diagnosis
6th Secondary

Char

6

Char

6

Char

6

Char

6

Char

6

RACE

SDIAG3
SDIAG4
SDIAG5
SDIAG6

Y=Yes, N=No, U=No Information,
W=Clinically Undetermined
1,E,(Blank)=Exempt
01 - 9999
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual,
Procedure Tabular.

Approximately 40%
of the records do not
have a primary
procedure.

Missing
White
African-American
Asian
American Indian
Other
Hispanic
Day in relation to
admission date.

001 – 999 ; V01 – V829
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
001 – 999 ; V01 – V829
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
001 – 999 ; V01 – V829
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
001 – 999 ; V01 – V829
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
001 – 999 ; V01 – V829
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
001 – 999 ; V01 – V829
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Variable Name
(for non-ASC11)
SDIAG7
SDIAG8
SDIAG9
SDIAG10
SDIAG11
SDIAG12
SDIAG13
SDIAG14
SECODE

SEX

Data
Element
Diagnosis
7th Secondary
Diagnosis
8th Secondary
Diagnosis
9th Secondary
Diagnosis
10th Secondary
Diagnosis
11th Secondary
Diagnosis
12th Secondary
Diagnosis
13th Secondary
Diagnosis
14th Secondary
Diagnosis
Place Of
Occurrence Injury
Code

Gender Of Patient

Type

Length

Char

6

Char

6

Char

6

Char

6

Char

6

Char

6

Char

6

Char

6

Char

6

Char

1

Values
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
001 – 999 ; V01 – V829
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
001 – 999 ; V01 – V829
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
001 – 999 ; V01 – V829
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
001 – 999 ; V01 – V829
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
001 – 999 ; V01 – V829
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
001 – 999 ; V01 – V829
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
001 – 999 ; V01 – V829
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
001 – 999 ; V01 – V829
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
E8490 Home
E8491 Farm
E8492 Mine/Quarry
E8493 Industrial Place and Premises
E8494 Place for Recreation and Sport
E8495 Street and Highway
E8496 Public Building
E8497 Residential Institution
E8498 Other Specified Places
M = Male
F = Female
U = Unknown
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Comments

Place of Occurrence
Code is not required
for all E-Codes.

Variable Name
(for non-ASC11)
SPC1
SPC2
SPC3
SPOA1-SPOA14

Data
Element
1st Physician
Specialty
2nd Physician
Specialty
3rd Physician
Specialty
Secondary Present
on Admissions

Type

Length

Char

3

Appendix C.1: Physician Specialty Codes

Char

3

Appendix C.1: Physician Specialty Codes

Char

3

Appendix C.1: Physician Specialty Codes

Char

1

Y=Yes, N=No, U=No Information,
W=Clinically Undetermined
1,E,(Blank)=Exempt
01 - 9999
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.

SPROC1

1st Secondary
Procedure

Char

7

SPROC1D

1st Secondary
Procedure Date

Num

8

SPROC2

2nd Secondary
Procedure
2nd Secondary
Procedure Date

Char

7

Num

8

Char

7

Num

8

Char

7

Num

8

SPROC2D

SPROC3
SPROC3D

SPROC4
SPROC4D

3rd Secondary
Procedure
3rd Secondary
Procedure Date
4th Secondary
Procedure
4th Secondary
Procedure Date

Values

Comments

Approximately 66%
of the records do not
have a 1st secondary
procedure.
Completion of this
field is directly
related to SPROC1.

01 - 9999
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
Completion of this
field is directly
related to SPROC2.
01 - 9999
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.

01 - 9999
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.

Completion of this
field is directly
related to SPROC3.
.
Completion of this
field is directly
related to SPROC4.
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Variable Name
(for non-ASC11)
SPROC5
SPROC5D

Data
Element
5th Secondary
Procedure
5th Secondary
Procedure Date

Type

Length

Char

7

Num

8

SPROC6

6th Secondary
Procedure

Char

7

SPROC6D

6th Secondary
Procedure Date

Num

8

SPROC7

7th Secondary
Procedure
7th Secondary
Procedure Date

Char

7

Num

8

Char

7

Num

8

Char

7

Num

8

Char

7

Num

8

Char

7

SPROC7D

SPROC8
SPROC8D

SPROC9
SPROC9D

SPROC10
SPROC10D

SPROC11

8th Secondary
Procedure
8th Secondary
Procedure Date
9th Secondary
Procedure
9th Secondary
Procedure Date
10th Secondary
Procedure
10th Secondary
Procedure Date
11th Secondary

Values

Comments

01 - 9999
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
Completion of this
field is directly
related to SPROC5.
01 - 9999
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
Completion of this
field is directly
related to SPROC6.
01 - 9999
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
Completion of this
field is directly
related to SPROC7.
01 - 9999
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
Completion of this
field is directly
related to SPROC8.
01 - 9999
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
Completion of this
field is directly
related to SPROC9.
01 - 9999
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
Completion of this
field is directly
related to SPROC10.
01 - 9999
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Variable Name
(for non-ASC11)
SPROC11D

SPROC12
SPROC12D

Data
Element
Procedure
11th Secondary
Procedure Date
12th Secondary
Procedure
12th Secondary
Procedure Date

Type

Length

Values

Comments

Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.
Num

8

Char

7

Num

8

Completion of this
field is directly
related to SPROC11.
01 - 9999
Refer to the ICD-9-CM Coding Manual.

TRLVL

Trauma level

Num

3

Appendix N – Trauma levels

Completion of this
field is directly
related to SPROC12.
Completion of this
field is directly
related to SPROC12.

TSTAT

Teaching Status

Char

1

URSTAT

Urban Rural
Status
Patient Zip Code

Char

1

Based on MSA

Char

9

T Teaching Hospital
N Non-Teaching Hospital
U Urban
R Rural
Digits 1-5

ZIP
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Based on patients
mailing address

Appendix C.1 – Physician Specialty Codes
(FLAGSPC1, FLAGSPC2, FLAGSPC3)
089
080
090
0AV
0BA
002

A
AD
ADL
ADM
ADP
AI

Allergy
Administrative Medicine
Adolescent Medicine
Addiction Medicine
Addiction Psychiatry
Allergy And Immunology

013
059
015
016
0BT
0WW

GPM
GS
GYN
HEM
HEP
HMP

General Preventive Medicine
General Surgery
Gynecology
Hematology (Internal Medicine)
Hepatology
Hematology (Pathology)

0KK
033
074
0AL
043
041

0LL

ALI

Allergy & Immunology/Clinical
And Laboratory Immunology

061

Head & Neck Surgery
Hemotologist/Oncologist
Hand Surgery (Orthopedic Surgery)

0AM

0XX

HNS
HO
HSO

001
003
0MM
056

AM
AN
APM
AS

Aerospace Medicine
Anesthesiology
Pain Management (Anesthesiology)
Abdominal Surgery

0YY

HSP

Surgery of the Hand (Plastic Surgery)

060

HSS

Surgery Of The Hand (Surgery)

0AN
038
039
040
0AA

085
000
0BC
0PP

ATP
BBK
CBG
CCA

Anatomic Pathology
Blood Banking/Transfusion Medicine
Clinical Biochemical Genetics
Critical Care Medicine
(Anesthesiology)

018
071
0AB

ID
IG
ILI

Infectious Disease
Immunology
Clinical And Laboratory Immunology (Internal
Medicine)

0BJ
0FF
051
064
0BK

0BD
092

CCG
CCM

019
0AC

IM
IMG

Internal Medicine
Geriatric Medicine (Internal Medicine)

0QQ
0GG
005
057
0CE
0BE

CCP
CCS
CD
CDS
CE
CG

Clinical Cytogenetics
Critical Care Medicine
(Internal Medicine)
Pediatric Critical Care Medicine
Surgical Critical Care (Surger)
Cardiovascular Disease
Cardiovascular Surgery
Cardiac Electrophysiology
Clinical Genetics

0BI

ISM

Sports Medicine (Internal Medicine)

021
087
0II
098

025
044
036
0BF
0SS
058

CHN
CHP
CLP
CMG
CN
CRS
CTS
D
DDL

Child Neurology
Child & Adolescent Psychiatry
Clinical Pathology
Clinical Molecular Genetics
Clinical Neurophysiology
Colon & Rectal Surgery
Cardio Thoracic Surgery
Dermatology
Clinical And Laboratory
Dermatological Immunology

024
0AD

LM
MFM
MG
MM
MPD
N
NCC

Legal Medicine
Maternal & Fetal Medicine
Medical Genetics
Medical Microbiology
Internal Medicine/Pediatrics
Neurology
Critical Care Medicine (Neurological Surgery)

0DD
023
027

NEO
NEP
NM

026
084

NP
NPM

006
0TT

OSS
OT
OTO
OTR
P
PA
PCC
PCH

Orthopedic Surgery of the Spine
Otology
Otolaryngology
Orthopedic Trauma
Psychiatry
Clinical Pharmacology
Pulmonary Critical Care
Chemical Pathology

0HH
0AO
047

PCP
PD
PDA
PDC
PDE
PDI
PDO
PDP
PDR
PDS
PDT
PE
PEM
PG
PH

Cytopathology
Pediatrics
Pediatric Allergy
Pediatric Cardiology
Pediatric Endocrinology
Pediatric Infectious Disease
Pediatric Otolaryncology
Pediatric Pulmonology
Pediatric Radiology
Pediatric Surgery
Medical Toxicology(Pediatrics)
Pediatric Emergency Medicine
Pediatric Emergency Medicine
Pediatric Gastroenterology
Public Health and General Prevention Medicine

082
0AP
0AQ

PHO
PIP
PLI

042

PM

Pediatric Hematology/Oncology
Immunopathology
Clinical And Laboratory
Immunology (Pediatrics)
Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation

Neo-Natal
Nephrology
Nuclear Medicine

0BL
083
0BM
0BU
0BN
065

PMD
PN
PO
PP
PPR
PS

Pain Medicine
Pediatric Nephrology
Pediatric Ophthalmology
Pediatric Pathology
Pediatric Rheumatology
Plastic Surgery

Neuropathology
Neonatal-Perinatal Medicine

0BO
035

PSM
PTH

Sports Medicine (Pediatrics)
Anatomic/Clinical Pathology
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099
062
0AF
028
0AG

NR
NS
NSP
NTR
OAR

Nuclear Radiology
Neurological Surgery
Pediatric Surgery (Neurology)
Nutrition
Adult Reconstructive Orthopedics

030
029
0AH

OBG
OBS
OCC

031
0AI
073

Family Practice
Geriatric Medicine (Family Practice)
Facial Plastic Surgery

FSM
GE
GER
GO
GP

Sports Medicine (Family Practice)
Gastroenterology
Geriatrics
Gynecological Oncology
General Practice

OST
USA
AF

Osteopathy
US Army
US Air Force

007
094
095
050
008
009

DIA
DLI
DMP
DR
EM
END

0LG

ESM

0BH

ETX

037

FOP

Diabetes
Diagnostic Laboratory/Immunology
Dermatopathology
Diagnostic Radiology
Emergency Medicine
Endocrinology, Diabetes And
Metabolism
Sports Medicine (Emergency
Medicine)
Medical Toxicology
(Emergency Medicine)
Forensic Pathology

010
0UU
096

FP
FPG
FPS

0VV
011
014
086
012

0BP

PTX

OM
OMO
ON

Obstetrics & Gynecology
Obstetrics
Critical Care Medicine (Obstetrics &
Gynecology)
Occupational Medicine
Musculoskeletal Oncology
Medical Oncology

048
045
0JJ
049
088
053
0BB
0BQ
0EE
0BR
081

0AJ
032
063

OP
OPH
ORS

Pediatric Orthopedics
Ophthalmology
Orthopedic Surgery

052
067
066

069

OS

0AK

OSM

Other Specialty (Physician
designated a specialty
other than appearing here)
Sports Medicine (Orthopedic Surgery)

068
0AT
0BS
0AU
0CC

PUD
PYA
PYG
R
REN
RHU
RIP
RNR
RO
RP
SH
SM
SO
TR
TRS
TS
TTS
U
UM
UP
VIR
VS

USN
PHS

US Navy
US Public Health Service

Medical Toxicology (Preventive
Medicine)
Pulmonary Diseases
Psychoanalysis
Geriatric Psychiatry
Radiology
Reproductive Endocrinology
Rheumatology
Radioisotopic Pathology
Neuroradiology
Radiation Oncology
Radiological Physics
Student Health
Sleep Medicine
Surgical Oncology
Therapeutic Radiation
Traumatic Surgery
Thoracic Surgery
Transplant Surgery
Urology
Undersea Medicine
Pediatric Urology
Vascular And Interventional Radiology
General Vascular Surgery

Note: No code appears for those physicians who have not designated a practice specialty. The code fix appears for those physicians in a transitional year of accredited graduate medical
education.
An asterisk (*) preceding a Type of Practice indicates the physician is currently in a residency training program.
An asterisk (*) following a Type of Practice indicates the physician has been certified by one of the American Board of Medical Specialties. Current certification information should be
obtained directly from the physician.
The information supplied by each physician on the type of practice is interpreted from the physician’s annual re-registration application. The Board has not verified the specific amount of
post-graduate training in this area of practice. The information on the type of practice is not to be used by any third party to determine specialty status. This information should be obtained
from the physician.
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Appendix C.2 – Major Diagnostic Categories
(MDC)
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13

Diseases of the Nervous System
Diseases and Disorders of the Eye
Ear, Nose, Mouth, and Throat
Respiratory System
Circulatory System
Diseases of the Digestive System
Hepatobiliary System and Pancrease
Musculoskeletal System
Skin, Subcutaneous Tissue, Breast
Endocrine, Nutritional, Metabolic
Kidney and Urinary Tract
Male Reproductive System
Female Reproductive System

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Other
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Pregnancy, Childbirth, Puerperium
Newborns, Other Neonates
Blood and Blood Forming Organs
Myeloproliferative Diseases
Infectious and Paras. Diseases
Mental Diseases and Disorders
Alcohol/Drug Use, Induc. Organ.
Injuries, Poisonings, Toxic
Burns
Factors Infl. Health Status
Multiple Significant Trauma
Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Unknown Diagnosis Code

Appendix C.3 – Payor
(PAYOR)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Self Pay
Medicare
Medicaid
Commercial Ins.
Worker's Compensation
Indigent/Charitable Organization
Other Government(Champus,State,County)
HMO
Not Stated
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Appendix C.4 – Trauma Levels
Taken from the “2005 South Carolina Health Plan”
South Carolina Sate Health Planning Committee & SC Department of Health and Environmental Control
Level I:
The highest level of capability available. Generally speaking, this hospital has to have general surgery capability in-house at all
times. Anesthesia capabilities are required to be in-house at all times, but this requirement may be met with CRNA’s or anesthesiology
chief residents. Orthopedic surgery, neurological surgery, and other surgical and medical specialties must be immediately available.
Generally, these trauma centers will be attached to medical schools or will have residency programs because of the in-house requirements,
since fourth year and senior trauma residents can help meet the requirements of the level I criteria. The Level I Trauma Center also has
the responsibility of providing education and outreach programs to other area hospitals and the public and must also conduct traumarelated research.
Level II:
This trauma center has extensive capability and meets the needs of most trauma victims. It is required to have general, neurologic,
and orthopedic surgery available when the patient arrives. Anesthesia capabilities are required to be in-house at all times, but this
requirement may be met with CRNA’s. Other surgical and medical specialties are required to be on-call and promptly available. These
hospitals may develop local procedures for the surgeon being available in the Emergency Department when the patient arrives. The major
difference between Level I and Level II facilities is that the major surgical specialties are allowed to be on-call but with the clear
commitment to be in the Emergency Department when the patient arrives. Level II hospitals do not have the research requirements of a
Level I trauma Center.
Level III:
These Hospitals are committed to caring for the trauma patient. Level III trauma centers can provide prompt assessment,
resuscitation, emergency operations, and stabilization, and also arrange for possible transfer to a facility that can provide definitive trauma
care. These hospitals are required to have general surgery, anesthesia, and internal medicine on-call and promptly available. The general
surgeon is required to be on-call and promptly available in the Emergency Department as the trauma team leader.
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01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10 – 19
20
21
22 – 29
30
31 – 39
40
41
42
43
44 – 49
50
51
52 – 60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67-69
70
71-99

Appendix C.5 – Patient Discharge Status
(DISP)
Discharged to home or self care (routine discharge)
Discharged/transferred to a short term general hospital for inpatient care
Discharged/transferred to skilled nursing facility (SNF) w/ Medicare certification
Discharged/transferred to an intermediate care facility (ICF)
Discharged/transferred to a non-Medicare PPS children’s hospital or non –Medicare PPS cancer hospital for inpatient care
Discharged/transferred to home under care of organized home health service organization
Left against medical advice or discontinued care
Discharged/transferred to home under care of a Home IV provider
Admitted as an inpatient to this hospital
Reserved for National Assignment
Expired
Effective 10/1/2009 – Dishcarged/transferred to court/law enfocement
Reserved for National Assignment
Still patient
Reserved for National Assignment
Expired at home
Expired in a medical facility, e.g. hospital, SNF, ICF, or free standing Hospice
Expired – place unknown
Discharged/transferred to a federal health care facility
Reserved for National Assignment
Hospice – home
Hospice – medical facility
Reserved for National Assignment
Discharged/transferred to hospital based Medicare approved swing bed w/in the hospital’s approved swing bed arrangement
Discharge/transferred to an inpatient rehabilitation facility (IRF) including rehabilitation distinct part units of a hospital
Discharged/transferred to a Medicare certified long term care hospital (LTCH)
Discharged/transferred to a nursing facility certified under Medicaid but not certified under Medicare
Discharged/transferred to a psychiatric hospital or psychiatric distinct part unit of a hospital
Discharged/transferred to a Critical Access Hospital (CAH)
Reserved for assignment by the NUBC
Discharged/transferred to another type of health care institution not defined elsewhere in this code list (see code 05)
Reserved for assignment by the NUBC
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Appendix D
Correlation Coefficients for Table 5.1 Odds Ratios and 95% Confidence Intervals for 30-Day AMI Readmissions
Correlation Coefficients among independent variables for the Logistic Regression
SelfCommercial
Female
Medicare Medicaid
Indigent
Payer
Insurance
Female
Self-Payer
Medicare
Medicaid
Commercial Insurance
Indigent
White
Black
Teaching Hospital

1.000
-0.012
0.047
0.045
-0.031
-0.014
-0.090
0.102
-0.004

1.000
-0.250
-0.072
-0.427
-0.155
-0.054
0.044
-0.063

1.000
-0.072
-0.423
-0.154
-0.064
0.074
0.030

1.000
-0.122
-0.045
-0.047
0.053
0.015
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1.000
-0.263
0.090
-0.089
-0.041

1.000
-0.016
0.014
0.126

White

Black

1.000
-0.917
-0.006

1.000
0.015

Teaching
Hospital

1.000

Appendix E
Hospital Readmission Rate and Percentage Poor Data
Hospital Readmission Data for the 48 Analyzed Hospitals
Hospital ID
AMI Admissions AMI Readmission Readmission Rate Percentage Poor*
Non-Teaching 1
38
1
2.63
9.66
Non-Teaching 2
33
2
6.06
11.15
Non-Teaching 3
73
5
6.85
6.04
Non-Teaching 4
58
4
6.9
13.09
Non-Teaching 5
42
3
7.14
15.64
Non-Teaching 6
96
7
7.29
8.07
Non-Teaching 7
68
5
7.35
4.74
Non-Teaching 8
63
5
7.94
5.28
Non-Teaching 9
71
6
8.45
21.26
Non-Teaching 10
59
5
8.47
21.51
Non-Teaching 11
64
6
9.38
5.51
Non-Teaching 12
62
6
9.68
8.52
Non-Teaching 13
121
12
9.92
13.27
Non-Teaching 14
196
21
10.71
10.55
Non-Teaching 15
476
53
11.13
12.19
Non-Teaching 16
71
8
11.27
20.72
Non-Teaching 17
190
22
11.58
9.66
Non-Teaching 18
120
14
11.67
15.84
Non-Teaching 19
111
13
11.71
13.96
Non-Teaching 20
129
16
12.4
7.7
*Percentage of poor is defined as the sum of Medicaid and Indigent patients divided by total patients
at that hospital.
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Appendix E Continued
Hospital ID
AMI Admissions AMI Readmission
Readmission Rate
Percentage Poor*
Non-Teaching 21
160
20
12.5
5.53
Non-Teaching 22
135
17
12.59
10.81
Non-Teaching 23
265
37
13.96
12.87
Non-Teaching 24
78
11
14.1
9.49
Non-Teaching 25
184
26
14.13
8.02
Non-Teaching 26
40
6
15
11.94
Non-Teaching 27
178
28
15.73
7.07
Non-Teaching 28
211
35
16.59
9.57
Non-Teaching 29
30
5
16.67
21.19
Non-Teaching 30
150
25
16.67
15.99
Non-Teaching 31
418
78
18.66
7.74
Non-Teaching 32
528
100
18.94
10.91
Non-Teaching 33
1476
281
19.04
6.75
Non-Teaching 34
631
121
19.18
9.91
Non-Teaching 35
165
32
19.39
20.02
Non-Teaching 36
115
23
20
4.92
Non-Teaching 37
179
38
21.23
11.31
Non-Teaching 38
423
104
24.59
8.44
Non-Teaching 39
290
77
26.55
7.69
Non-Teaching 40
497
140
28.17
13.38
*Percentage of poor is defined as the sum of Medicaid and Indigent patients divided by total patients at
that hospital.
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Appendix E Continued
Hospital ID
AMI Admissions
AMI Readmission
Readmission Rate
Percentage Poor*
Teaching 1
68
9
13.24
15.68
Teaching 2
397
65
16.37
7.52
Teaching 3
971
199
20.49
12.8
Teaching 4
736
155
21.06
21.55
Teaching 5
1412
323
22.88
21.42
Teaching 6
1003
237
23.63
11.06
Teaching 7
457
109
23.85
9.96
Teaching 8
455
110
24.18
8.87
*Percentage of poor is defined as the sum of Medicaid and Indigent patients divided by total patients at that
hospital.
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Appendix F
Two Methods for Estimating Average Reference Readmission Rates And Percentage
Poor Patients
Comparison of Hospital Average Readmission Rate and Weighted Hospital
Average Readmission Rate By Overall Total and Quintile
Average
Weighted Average
Percentage Poor
Grouping
Rate
Rate*
Patients**
Total
14.75%
19.03%
11.60%
Quintile 1
12.80%
16.89%
5.63%
Quintile 2
16.84%
20.38%
8.28%
Quintile 3
14.58%
19.43%
10.32%
Quintile 4
14.57%
18.29%
13.05%
Quintile 5
14.98%
20.20%
19.52%
*Weighted average rate weights each hospital AMI readmission rate by the
number of AMI patients admitted to each hospital relative to the overall total
or quintile total. **Percentage poor patients is the percentage of indigent and
Medicaid patients admitted for AMI relative to all AMI patients served by
hospitals in each quintile and overall total.

128

Appendix G
Bootstrapping Sample Code
Let hi serve as placeholder for identification of each of the 48 hospitals. hi -> hn where
n=48
hi <- rbinom(1, (hi Sample size), (hi readmission rate))
theta. hi.ra<-function(hi){rbinom(1, (hi Sample size), (hi readmission rate))}
boot. hi.ra<-bootstrap(hi, 1000, theta. hi.ra)
CI hi <-binom.confint(boot. hi.ra$thetastar, (hi Sample size), conf.level = 0.95,
method="exact")
N=nrow(CI hi)
CI hi$X<-(1:N)
CI hi$Hosp<-" hi "
CI hi$HID<-paste(CI hi $Hosp, CI hi $X, sep=".")
#aggregate all boostraps
data<-rbind(CI hi, ...., CI hn )
#sort by bootstrap iteration X, where X[1:1000]
datasort<-data[order(data$X),]

#Create 1,000 unique to determine excess readmission rates
pctra <- with(datasort,
by(datasort, datasort$X,
function(datasort) phat<-(sum(datasort$x)/sum(datasort$n))))
pctra
RA<-t(sapply(pctra, I))
RA<-as.data.frame(RA)

#Attach the 1,000 to each hospital for determination of excess readmission
data1<-merge(data, RA, by="X", all.x=T)
data1sort<-data1[order(data1$X,data1$HID),]

#Repeat above analysis for each quintile
datasort<-data[order(data$quintile),]
pctra.quint <- with(datasort,
by(datasort, datasort$quintile,
function(datasort) phat.quint <-(sum(datasort$x)/sum(datasort$n))))
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Appendix G continued
pctra.quint
RA.quint <-t(sapply(pctra.quint, I))
RA.quint <-as.data.frame(RA1.quint)
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Appendix H
Logistic Regression Code
R Code for logistic Regression including age
summary(model1<-glm(RA ~ AGE + female + PAY.SELF + PAY.CARE + PAY.CAID
+ PAY.COMINS + PAY.INDIGENT + WHITE + BLACK + as.factor(TSTAT),
data=ami, family=binomial(logit)))
summary(model1)
exp(coef(model1))
exp(confint(model1))

R Code for logistic Regression excluding age
summary(model2<-glm(RA ~ female + PAY.SELF + PAY.CARE + PAY.CAID +
PAY.COMINS
+ PAY.INDIGENT + WHITE + BLACK + as.factor(TSTAT)
, data=ami, family=binomial(logit)))
summary(model2)
exp(coef(model2))
exp(confint(model2))
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